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Del Wright Jr.*
“[T]here is a material difference between structuring a real transaction in
a particular way to provide a tax benefit (which is legitimate), and creating
a transaction, without a business purpose, in order to create a tax benefit
(which is illegitimate).”†
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, taxpayers who participated in the Son of Boss tax shelter
received a $1 billion windfall from the government, based on the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC
(“Home Concrete”).1 In the last ten years, by the Internal Revenue Service’s
(“IRS”) own estimate, Son of Boss generated over $6 billion in improper
tax benefits.2 While many taxpayers who participated in the Son of Boss
*.
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†.
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1.
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Patrick
Temple-West, Supreme Court Restrains IRS in Tax Shelter Case (Apr. 25, 2012, 1:03 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-tax-supreme-courtidUSBRE83O11920120425. Home Concrete provided significant clarity in Son of Boss
litigations, as it cleared the fog surrounding several decisions at the Court of Appeals level. Id.;
see infra Part III.B (discussing Home Concrete).
2.
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2009-30-018, DESPITE THE SUCCESS
ACHIEVED, THE SON OF BOSS SETTLEMENT HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON INVESTOR FILING AND
PAYMENT
COMPLIANCE
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200930018fr.pdf. Although the IRS
settlement generated a significant amount of revenue from previously improper tax benefits, it
has failed to ensure future compliance. See id. at 3; see also infra Part III (describing the BOSS
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transaction settled their cases with the IRS, the effect of entering into the
transaction was often a net positive for those who settled.3 Among those
who chose not to settle, based on the government’s loss in Home Concrete,
taxpayers were allowed to keep the roughly $1 billion in tax benefits
generated from those taxpayers’ transactions.
The Son of Boss shelter, at its core, was derived from a financial strategy
called a “short against the box,”4 which, since the 1930s, has allowed
taxpayers to avoid paying billions of dollars in capital gains taxes.5 The
government shut down the original form of the short against the box
transaction in the mid-1990s and later shut down the Son of Boss
transaction in the mid-2000s. Despite those government actions, however,
numerous tax shelters derived from the short against the box strategy have
robbed the U.S. Treasury of billions of dollars of tax revenue. Those
shelters, and the government’s response to them, are discussed herein.
Taxpayers and the IRS have long engaged in a battle over tax shelters. 6
After the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”)7 was amended substantially in

transaction and in turn, the development of the Son of Boss transaction). The government
identified just over 1,800 taxpayers who participated in Son of Boss transactions, and, as of
March 2005, approximately 1,165 had participated in the settlement initiative. Press Release,
IRS, IRS Collects $3.2 Billion from Son of Boss; Final Figure Should Top $3.5 Billion (Mar.
24, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Collects-$3.2-Billion-from-Son-of-Boss;Final-Figure-Should-Top-$3.5-Billion.
3.
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the IRS Son of Boss Settlement Initiative).
4.
In a “short against the box,” also sometimes referred to as a “short sale against the
box,” a taxpayer owns a long position in a stock and borrows and sells short an equal amount of
stock. See Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual Analysis of Tax Ownership, 85 B.U. L. REV. 431, 437–
41 (2005) (providing that “taxpayers entering into a short against the box trade (and several
other transactions) are viewed as constructively selling their appreciated stock and realizing the
built-in gain when they enter into the transaction”) (emphasis added).
5.
See Frances Barton Farr v. Comm’r, 33 B.T.A. 557, 561 (1935); G.C.M. 7451, IX-1
C.B. 81 (1930), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/122379659/Bureau-of-InternalRevenue-Cumulative-Bulletin-IX-1-1930; see also Note, Federal Taxation of Short Sales of
Securities, 56 HARV. L. REV. 274 (1942) [hereinafter Federal Taxation].
6.
“Tax shelter,” as used herein, refers generally to:
[A] tax-motivated transaction that relies on a nonobvious (or, in some cases,
implausible) interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code that is highly
beneficial to the taxpayer (in terms of lowering their taxes) and that has no
plausible policy justification—in the sense that one cannot offer an even
moderately persuasive story that Congress intended to encourage this
particular class of transactions through the tax system.
Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions: Is There an Ideal Way to Deal With the Non-Ideal World of
Legal Change?: Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 211, 231 (2003). Alternatively, some use Michael Graetz’s famous
characterization of a tax shelter as, “a deal done by very smart people that, absent tax
considerations, would be very stupid.” E.g., Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of
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1986, numerous large-scale tax shelters became obsolete.8 What emerged
after the 1986 amendment, however, was a cottage industry of tax
professionals creating more targeted tax shelters for corporations and high
net worth taxpayers.9
Many of these modern tax shelters are structured to take advantage of
gaps in the law or regulations, particularly with respect to the taxation of
combined financial products. Two of the largest such tax shelters, the Son
of Boss and the Contingent Deferred Swap (“CDS”) transactions, used
combined financial products to turn the Code on its head, generating
billions of dollars of tax benefits for transactions largely devoid of
substance.10
Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (quoting Yale Law
Professor Michael Graetz).
7.
All references to the Code included herein, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
8.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 Act]. The 1986 Act was in part a response to the proliferation of retail tax shelters that
gave more and more taxpayers the ability to avoid taxes through transactions designed solely to
shelter their income from taxes. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of
Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L. REV. 401, 426–27 (1989) (describing the effects of the 1986
amendment to the Code). Shaviro provides that:
Despite the proliferation of antitax shelter statutes and cases, the tax shelter
industry continued to grow through at least the early 1980’s, and remained in
the forefront of public attention through enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986. The 1986 Act, however, brought decisive change. By lowering tax
rates, creating a flatter rate structure, adding the passive loss rules to the
Code, and repealing certain tax preferences, the Act essentially put an end to
much of the public tax shelter activity that had taken place over the previous
15 or 20 years.
Id. at 426 (internal footnotes omitted).
9.
See MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF
ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS 18 (2003) (quoting testimony of
Michael Brostek before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-108SPRT90655/pdf/CPRT-108SPRT90655.pdf
(“describing ‘abusive shelters’ as ‘very complicated transactions promoted to corporations and
wealthy individuals to exploit tax loopholes and provide large, unintended tax benefits.’”).
10. The tax benefits discussed herein were created by tax deferral or tax avoidance.
Deferral refers to a transaction’s ability to delay the obligation to pay taxes until sometime in
the future. See Lynnley Browning, Tax Deferral Strategy Gets Closer Look at IRS, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/business/worldbusiness/11ihttax.1.9920826.html (discussing the IRS’ response to one deferral strategy, known as a variable
prepaid forward contract (discussed infra)). Tax avoidance, as used herein, refers to a
transaction’s ability to make taxes go away altogether. Often, tax avoidance is achieved by
either creating non-economic or phantom losses that offset a taxpayer’s other income, or by
making a temporary tax deferral permanent. See, e.g., Zoë Prebble & John Prebble, The
Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 698, 700–01 (2010) (arguing that tax
avoidance is not only legal, but a moral scheme with a goal of minimizing tax liability). Many
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One major reason for the proliferation of these tax shelters has been the
difficulty in crafting a comprehensive approach to the tax treatment of
combined financial positions. That difficulty has been exacerbated by
advances in finance regarding the use and pricing of derivatives. Many tax
shelters rely on derivatives and other financial assets to create “synthetic”
transactions.11 While those economic returns may be the same between a
particular financial asset and a synthetic financial asset, other aspects such
as the tax treatment or the legal or voting rights with respect to the asset are
often markedly different. As part of their financial alchemy, sophisticated
tax planners have used those differences to conjure the equivalent of tax
gold, i.e., helping corporations and high net worth individual taxpayers
defer or avoid billions of dollars in tax liability.12
The tax shelters described in this Article were structured to exploit, yet
purportedly stay within the bounds of, the tax laws. Such shelters are
generally described as “technical” tax shelters.13 According to the IRS, a
“‘technical tax shelter’ [is distinguishable] from a ‘scheme or scam’ or
tax shelters do both. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-750,
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: DISPARATE TAX TREATMENT AND INFORMATION GAPS CREATE
UNCERTAINTY
AND
POTENTIAL
ABUSE
41
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11750.pdf (describing the potential for abuse of financial
derivatives by the nation’s taxpayers).
11. Derivatives securities, or “derivatives,” are financial instruments, the value of which is
determined by reference to one or more underlying assets. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, &
OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (5th ed. 2003). The use of derivatives blossomed subsequent to the
discovery of a more precise method to price derivatives. That discovery is generally credited to
Fischer Black, Robert Merton, and Myron Scholes. See generally Fischer Black & Myron
Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973),
available
at
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall00/cs323/resources/blackscholes.pdf. As a
general matter, the economic returns available on any particular financial asset (e.g., a stock or a
bond) can be replicated using a combination of derivatives to create a synthetic position. The
most basic synthetic replication strategy is based on the put-call parity relationship, which holds
generally that a “long” call, a “short” put, and owning a bond is economically equivalent to
owning stock. See HULL, supra, at 174–75 (providing an example of how different
combinations of derivatives can create different positions and outcomes).
12. In many tax shelters, individual taxpayers often use a partnership and the Byzantine
intricacies of Subchapter K of the Code to realize the tax benefits of a particular transaction. See
I.R.C. §§ 701–77 (2006) (governing partnerships). This Article will only briefly describe the
Subchapter K machinations used in tax shelters.
13. The term tax shelter also describes patently illegal schemes, often promoted by tax
protestors and others of their ilk, which blatantly misinterpret existing law. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL
TAX
MANUAL
§ 40.01
(2001),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/40ctax.htm (providing that “[i]llegal tax
protest schemes range from simply failing to file tax returns to concealing financial transactions
and assets in warehouse banks and trusts to filing frivolous liens to interfere with IRS
investigations”).
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outright tax evasion that finds no support in either the law or the facts.”14 A
technical tax shelter is also different from a simple exploitation of the Code
to create a benefit, such as the use by hedge funds to convert their
performance fees into carried interests, allowing those fees to be taxed at
the capital gains rates rather than ordinary income rates.15 One practical
definition was provided by former Treasury Assistant Secretary Eric
Solomon, who described a technical tax shelter as a “tax-engineered
transaction normally with little business purpose except to save taxes with
minimal risk or profit potential often designed to create a tax loss without
an economic loss or in some cases to make income nontaxable.”16
The technical tax shelters described herein “appeared to satisfy the
technical requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, but not its spirit.”17
However, the promoted tax benefits of those shelters often failed to
withstand challenge from either the IRS or the courts. The question this
raises is why, if they failed to withstand challenge, did they multiply like
the famous Star Trek Tribbles?18
14. B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, IRS, Resolving Tax Shelters: By Settlement or
Litigation 2 (Feb. 25, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/sheltersfeb25.pdf).
15. See John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 618 (2009) (noting that
performance fees paid to private fund managers “are taxed more favorably (as carried interest)”
than other fees paid by mutual fund); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying
Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1071, 1075 (2008) (explaining that fund managers’ income is taxed at capital gains rates
rather than higher ordinary income rates); see also Teresa Tritch, Two-and-Twenty Tax Dodges,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, available at http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/twoand-twenty-tax-dodges/ (explaining that private equity partners avoid taxes through a loophole
that enables fees to be taxed as capital gains). In its reporting, the New York Times estimated
that “four Bain funds in which [2012 Republican nominee for the U.S. Presidency Mitt]
Romney family’s trusts are invested converted $1.05 billion in management fees—which should
be taxed as ordinary income—into capital gains, which are taxed at the much lower rate. The tax
savings: $220 million.” Id.
16. Eric Solomon, Remarks at Tax Policy Center–Tax Analysts Forum on Tax Shelters 11
(Feb. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/40295145/TAX-POLICYCENTER----TAX-ANALYSTS-FORUM-ON-TAX-SHELTERS).
17. Eric Solomon, A Short History of Tax Shelters 2 (Dec. 9, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.utcle.org/eLibrary/preview.php?asset_file_id=22933). In his remarks, Solomon
noted that, “[t]hese tax shelters are to be contrasted with situations in which taxpayers engage in
tax evasion without any technical argument for their position, such as hiding assets and income
in offshore accounts.” Id.; see also IRS, ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES FOR TAXPAYERS
INVOLVED IN TAX SHELTER TRANSACTIONS, AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE (ATG), available at
http://www.unclefed.com/SurviveIRS/MSSP/penalty_final.pdf (providing a guide for IRS
examiners in implementing tax penalties to all taxpayers involved in tax shelter transactions).
18. Tribbles were depicted in the original Star Trek television series as small furry
creatures
with
a
proclivity
for
procreation.
STAR
TREK
DATABASE,
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The answer lies in the chance of getting caught: even though the
transactions likely would not have withstood government scrutiny, that
scrutiny would have occurred only if the government discovered the
transaction through the auditing process before the relevant statute of
limitations had elapsed, which is often three years.19 Because the incidence
of audit is fairly low, rational taxpayers simply looked at the expected value
of entering into the shelter, equal to the expected benefits minus the
expected costs.20 The expected benefits are obvious—the money saved by
not paying tax. The expected costs are more difficult to determine, as they
depend on the likelihood of the IRS detecting the transaction in time, the
likelihood of the transaction withstanding IRS scrutiny, the likelihood of
settlement, and the taxpayer’s time value of money calculation. As
discussed in Part IV, sophisticated tax planners have leveraged that
expected value calculation to benefit their clients at the government’s
expense.
Technical tax shelters have proliferated, in part, because neither
Congress nor the IRS has developed a comprehensive system of rules for
the tax treatment of combined financial positions. Moreover, both Congress
and the IRS have unintentionally made it easier for those tax planners by
drafting multiple regimes for taxing economically similar, yet structurally
distinct, financial positions.21 Absent changes in both the law and the IRS’s
http://www.startrek.com/database_article/tribble (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). Their first
appearance in the series was the 1967 episode of Star Trek entitled The Trouble with Tribbles,
in which the crew of the U.S.S. Enterprise solved their “trouble” with the Tribbles by
transporting them to an enemy Klingon ship.
STAR TREK DATABASE,
http://www.startrek.com/database_article/trouble-with-tribbles-the (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
19. The IRS cannot assess a tax after the statute of limitations on assessment has expired,
even if the taxpayer agrees to the assessment. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2006); see also Rev. Rul.
72-42, 1972-1 C.B. 398. Generally, the IRS must make an assessment three years from the later
of (1) the due date of the return, or (2) the date the return is filed. See I.R.C. § 6501(a), (b). The
three-year rule can be extended by agreement. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4).
20. See IRS, DATA BOOK, 2010, 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/10databk.pdf (providing that as of 2010, the chance of audit for all individual taxpayers was
about 1.1%, 2.5% for individuals earning between $200,000 and $1 million, and 8.4% for
individuals earning over $1 million); see also infra Part IV (illustrating that even with the
greater likelihood of audit, participating in a shelter may still be the rational economic choice).
21. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Linda Z. Swartz, U.S. International Tax Treatment
of Financial Derivatives, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 61-49 (1997) (“To date, [the] Treasury has
failed to propose a single, workable set of tax rules to govern the use of derivative products
either between domestic parties or domestic and foreign parties.”); Samuel D. Brunson, Elective
Taxation of Risk-Based Financial Instruments: A Proposal, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 2
(2007) (“The current state of taxation of financial instruments is a mess. The rules are
complicated, unfair, inconsistent, and patchwork; there is no underlying policy or vision guiding
the development of the rules.”). For a discussion of the various possible taxing regimes for one
particular financial product, see N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON PREPAID
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approach to shelters, the Tribble-like proliferation of tax shelters will
continue.22
This Article discusses the history of using modern financial techniques to
create tax-advantaged transactions and technical tax shelters, and it offers
analyses and critiques of the current approach. Part II provides a brief
overview of the taxation of financial instruments, to help explain how the
tax shelters described in this Article sought to exploit U.S. tax laws.23 Part
III then provides specific examples of technical tax shelters, offering an
analysis of the shelters’ financial and tax positions and a description of the
government’s responses to those shelters. Part IV explains the calculus used
by tax shelter participants, and how that calculus encourages taxpayers to
play the tax shelter game. Part V offers suggested changes to the tax laws
and discusses how those changes could affect taxpayer behavior.
II.

FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND TAXATION

Tax shelters involve many financial transactions to create their soughtafter tax benefits. To understand how financial positions are used to create
tax shelters, it is first important to understand the financial building blocks
of tax shelters. One key financial transaction used in many tax shelters, and
which serves as the backbone of many of the shelters discussed herein, is
the short sale.24
Short selling is the selling of a stock that the seller does not own. A short
sale requires that the short seller borrow shares, sell those shares, and
promise to return shares to the lender at some point in the future. Investors
often enter into short sales when they believe the price of a financial asset
will fall. To illustrate a short sale, assume an investor (the “short seller”)
FORWARD
CONTRACTS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1159Report.pdf.
22. Unfortunately, a device that could use a Star Trek-like transporter beam to send
technical tax shelters to Qo’noS (the Klingon homeworld) is, as of the date of this article,
undiscovered.
23. Tax laws, as referred to herein, “begin[] with the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),
enacted by Congress in Title 26 of the United States Code” and include U.S. Treasury
regulations that provide “the official interpretation of the IRC by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury.” IRS, Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance, http://www.irs.gov/TaxProfessionals/Tax-Code,-Regulations-and-Official-Guidance (last updated Aug. 2, 2012). In
addition, “the IRS publishes a regular series of other forms of official tax guidance, including
revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices, and announcements.” Id.
24. The Supreme Court has defined a short sale as, “a contract for the sale of shares which
the seller does not own or the certificates for which are not within his control so as to be
available for delivery at the time when, under the rules of the [stock exchange], delivery must be
made.” Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 450–51 (1926).
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enters into a short sale of a stock when the price is $100 per share; the
investor will borrow the stock from another party and immediately sell the
borrowed shares for $100 per share.25 Because the short seller borrowed the
shares, however, she will have an obligation to return the shares to the
lender sometime in the future. If the shares fall in value, the short seller can
profit because she can then purchase shares at a market price below $100,
say $75 per share, and use those newly purchased shares to satisfy her
obligation to the lender. The return of borrowed shares to the lender is
called “closing out the short,” and, in this example, would generate a $25
per share profit for the investor.26
Short sales are generally taxed using a “wait-and-see,” or “open”
treatment, meaning the investor will not have to recognize gain or loss until
she closes out the short.27 In our example, the investor would not be
required to recognize income until she closes out the short by returning the
borrowed shares back to the lender. At that point, she would be required to
recognize $25 per share of income, the difference between the price at
which she sold the shares ($100) and the price at which she purchased the
shares to return to the lender ($75).28
In that example, open treatment makes sense, because even though the
investor received $100 at the transaction’s initiation, there was nothing to
measure that $100 against to determine the investment’s profitability. The
$100 merely represents the maximum potential profit from the transaction
(because the stock cannot have a value below zero). However, as discussed
infra, tax shelter promoters have exploited open treatment by combining
financial positions to create paper losses, defer gains, and make taxable
income disappear.29
Like short sales, derivatives are also generally taxed using open
treatment.30 A derivative is a financial instrument, the value of which is

25. That other party is often a broker or a dealer in securities.
26. Closing out the short is sometimes referred to as covering the short.
27. The rules for taxation of short sales are set forth in I.R.C. § 1233, and the U.S.
Treasury Regulations issues thereunder. Those regulations provide that, for “income tax
purposes, a short sale is not deemed to be consummated until delivery of property to close the
short sale.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1233–1(a) (2006); see also Rev. Rul. 72-478, 1972-2 C.B. 487; Rev.
Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265; Federal Taxation, supra note 5, at 274.
28. This example excludes any borrowing costs.
29. “Promoter,” as used herein, denotes a tax shelter promoter.
30. See Alvin C. Warren Jr., U.S. Income Taxation of New Financial Products, 88 J. PUB.
ECON. 899, 901 (2004) (“This wait-and-see approach applies generally to assets with contingent,
rather than fixed, returns, including forward contracts and options.”); see generally JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-21-08, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO THE TAX
TREATMENT
OF
DERIVATIVES
15–23
(2008),
available
at
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determined by reference to some other underlying asset.31 Open tax
treatment for derivatives works well when the derivatives’ economic returns
are contingent, i.e., uncertain and subject to risks. Yet that same open
treatment becomes subject to exploitation when a derivative is coupled with
another financial position in such a way that the combined positions have,
for all practical purposes, allowed the investor to profit from the position
while eliminating any additional risk and without subjecting those profits to
taxation. Absent any real transactional risk, little justification exists for
open treatment. Yet tax shelter promoters have often structured derivatives
to achieve just that result, with the only loser being the fisc.
Many types of derivative securities exist, with forwards and options
being the most common. Forwards and options also often serve as the basic
building blocks for more complex derivative securities.32 Of those more
complex derivatives, the most common is a swap, which is “[a]n agreement
to exchange cash flows in the future according to a prearranged formula.” 33
A swap is often structured to be economically equivalent to a series of
forward contracts.34 The derivatives in the tax shelters described in this
Article were structured using forwards, options, swaps, or some
combination of the three.
A.

Understanding Forwards

A forward contract is an executory contract to buy or sell an asset at a
certain time in the future for a certain price.35 Forward contracts are defined
for U.S. tax purposes as privately negotiated contracts that provide for the
sale and purchase of property for a specified price on a specified date. 36
Forward contracts, as derivative securities, have open treatment. Thus,
“until the forward contract is sold, exchanged, settled or allowed to lapse
[hereinafter known as being complete], the transaction is treated as open,
and any gain or loss to the parties is deferred.”37
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1319 (providing a general overview
of the taxation of derivatives).
31. HULL, supra note 11.
32. See Id., at 594–99; SALIH N. NEFTCI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 2 (2d ed. 2000).
33. HULL, supra note 11, at 712.
34. See Id., at 125 (“[a] forward contract can be viewed as a simple example of a swap. . . .
Whereas a forward contract leads to the exchange of cash flows on just one future date, swaps
typically lead to cash flow exchanges taking place on several future dates.”).
35. HULL, supra note 11, at 2.
36. Glass v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087, 1101 (1986); HULL, supra note 11, at 2.
37. Yoram Keinan, The Case for Residency-Based Taxation of Financial Transactions in
Developing Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 39 (2008).
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An example of a simple forward contract would be as follows: Party A
agrees to buy 100 barrels of oil from Party B in 90 days at a price of $115
per barrel. In this example, Party A has assumed a “long” position in the
forward contract.38 Generally, Party A’s long position will benefit from
rising prices of oil over the next 90 days because Party A has the right to
purchase oil at $115 no matter the market (spot) price of oil in 90 days. 39
Alternatively, Party B has assumed a “short” position, because she has
agreed to sell the oil and will generally be in a better position if the price of
oil falls in the next 90 days.40
In a typical forward contract, neither party to the contract makes a
payment at the time the contract is executed, although arrangements for
collateral may be made.41 However, a forward contract could call for
payment up front, and that transaction is generally described as a prepaid
forward. In a typical prepaid forward contract, using the forward contract
example above, Party A would pay for the price of 100 barrels of oil up
front to Party B. However, the price would not be $115 per barrel; it would
be the amount that, if invested at a specific market rate (i.e., the forward
rate),42 would be worth $115 in 90 days (in other words, the discounted
value or present value of $115).43
38. A “long” position denotes ownership of a security or derivative. Informally, one who
owns 100 shares of a stock is said to be “long 100 of the stock.” Likewise, an investor who has
purchased (or holds) an option is said to be “long the option” because he or she has the right to
exercise the option at a later date. The party with a “long” position will generally be in a better
position if the price of the underlying asset rises. While this is generally true for most assets, a
long position need not increase in value as the price of the underlying asset increases. For
example, if an investor were long a put option, that investor’s put option would increase in
value as the value of the underlying stock decreased.
39. The current price of a security is called its spot price. Similarly, an agreement to buy
or sell an asset today is a spot contract. HULL, supra note 11, at 2.
40. For derivative securities, a “short” position is an investment position in which the
investor either has written an option or has sold a commodity contract, with the obligation
remaining outstanding. For stocks and bonds and other physical securities, a “short” position is
a net investment position in a security in which the security has been borrowed and sold, but not
yet replaced.
41. Treatment of Prepaid Derivative Contracts, Attached to Congressman Richard Neal,
Chairman of Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Remarks to the U.S. House of
Representatives
(Dec.
19,
2007),
http://neal.house.gov/images/pdf/background_on_neal_prepaid_derivatives_bill.pdf.
42. A rate applicable to a financial transaction that will take place in the future. See HULL,
supra note 11, at 98–100. The forward rate is often based on the cost of carry, or the cost of
holding a position for a period of time.
43. Party A would only agree to pay the present value of $115 because he is advancing
money to Party B, yet delivery will not occur for 90 days. Party A thus needs to be compensated
for paying for a product for which delivery is delayed. Party B would still have the obligation to
deliver 100 barrels of oil in 90 days, but Party B now has the option to either purchase the oil up
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Understanding Options

Options are financial contracts that give their holders the right, but not
the obligation, to buy or sell some asset in the future for a certain price. 44
Generally, there are two broad categories of options—call options and put
options.
1.

Call Options

Call options give the holder the right to buy an underlying asset on or
before a certain date (the exercise date) for a certain price (the exercise
price).45 An example of an equity call option is a contract giving the holder
the right to buy 100 shares of Google stock (ticker: GOOG) for $600 per
share (the strike price) on or before January 18, 2013 (the exercise date). As
of August 15, 2012, when GOOG was trading at approximately $667 per
share, a call option with a strike price of $600 and an exercise date of
January 18, 2013, was priced at $82.60.46

2.

Put Options

Put options give the holder of the option the right to sell the underlying
asset on or before an exercise date at a certain strike price.47 An example of
a put option is a contract giving the holder the right to sell 100 shares of
GOOG for $600 per share (the strike price) on or before January 18, 2013
(the exercise date). As of August 15, 2012, a Google put option with a $600
strike price and a January 18, 2013 exercise date was priced at $17.22.48
3.

Options and Firm Value

Modern finance has long understood that a firm’s equity value, at its
core, can be thought of as an option.49 From a theoretical perspective, a
front with the amount paid by Party A, or wait until later to purchase the oil, usually with the
hope that the price of oil will fall.
44. HULL, supra note 11, at 151.
45. “American” options can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date.
Alternatively, “European” options can only be exercised on the expiration date. Id.
46. The prices quoted herein were intraday prices.
47. HULL, supra note 11, at 6.
48. See supra note 46.
49. “Long” meaning at least since 1973, when Fischer Black and Myron Scholes
published their groundbreaking paper, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,” in
The Journal of Political Economy. Black & Scholes, supra note 11. In 1997, Robert Merton and
Myron Scholes (who expanded the mathematical understanding of Black and Scholes’ work)
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firm’s equity is equivalent to a call option on the value of the firm’s assets,
with the value of the liabilities as the strike price of the option.50 For
example, if Company A was established with $100X contributed as equity
and then borrowed $50X, it would have assets of $150X, debt of $50X, and
equity of $100X. The value of that equity, $100X, is also the price of an
immediately exercisable call option on the entire Company with a strike
price of $50X. While such a theoretical construct has limited applicability
for public companies, the concept has been used by tax planners, as
discussed infra, to create tax shelters for their clients.
4.

Swaps

A swap is an agreement between two counterparties to exchange cash
flows related to one or more underlying assets over some period in the
future.51 From a financial market perspective, a swap is merely a series of
forward contracts bundled into one contract.52 The IRS has determined that
swaps should be categorized as a type of notional principal contract
(“NPC”).53 The tax treatment of NPCs is governed primarily by regulations
issued pursuant to Section 446 of the Code. Treasury regulations define an
NPC as “a financial instrument that provides for the payment of amounts by
one party to another at specified intervals calculated by reference to a

were awarded a Nobel Prize for their work (Fischer Black was mentioned as a contributor to the
prize, but was ineligible to receive the prize because he died in 1995). Press Release, The Royal
Swed. Acad. of Scis., 1997 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (Oct. 14, 1997),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1997/press.html.
50. See, e.g., Eric Falkenstein & Andrew Boral, Some Empirical Results on the Merton
Model, in RISK PROF. (2001), available at http://www.efalken.com/papers/Mertonmodel.htm;
Aswath Damodaran, Applications of Option Pricing Theory to Equity Valuation,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/lectures/opt.html (last visited Feb. 13,
2013);
Aswath
Damodaran,
Option
Pricing
Applications
in
Valuation,
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/eqnotes/optequity.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
51. See HULL, supra note 11, at 125.
52. See CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR. ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 45, 48–49 (1990)
(stating that “a swap contract is in essence nothing more complicated than a series of forward
contracts strung together”); David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax Treatment of Economically
Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity
Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 471, 494 (1997) (providing
that long equity swaps are “economically equivalent to a cash-settled, prepaid forward contract”
on the underlying property).
53. An NPC is sometimes referred to simply as a swap, although a swap is more narrow
because the definition of an NPC includes other financial products such as caps and floors. The
Treasury regulations define NPCs to include “interest rate swaps, currency swaps, basis swaps,
interest rate caps, interest rate floors, commodity swaps, equity swaps, equity index swaps, and
similar agreements.” Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (2006).

45:0000]

FINANCIAL ALCHEMY

13

specified index upon a notional principal amount in exchange for specified
consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts.”54
One of the more common types of swaps is the total return swap, which
is typically a financial contract in which one party agrees to make payments
based on a set rate (either fixed or floating), and the other party agrees to
make payments based on the total economic return of one or more
underlying financial assets.55 A total return swap can be used to replicate the
returns on any individual or group of financial assets. Total return swaps are
often structured to replicate a secured borrowing (i.e., borrowing money to
purchase an asset and using the asset as security for the borrowing), but
with significantly different risks.56
For example, if a foreign party wanted to invest in a particular stock,
such as stock in a U.S. defense contractor, but was prohibited from owning
the stock because of either U.S. or its own country’s laws, it could enter into
a total return swap with a U.S. bank (Bank) to replicate the returns on that
stock. The transaction could be structured as follows:
1) The foreign party (FP) determines the cost of the stock it
wants to acquire, say $100 million of defense contractor stock
(DC Stock);
2) FP enters into a five-year total return swap with Bank on a
$100 million notional amount, wherein Bank agrees to pay
any positive financial returns on a basket of $100 million of
DC Stock to FP, and FP agrees to make periodic interest-like
payments on the $100 million notional amount to Bank, and
further agrees to pay any negative financial returns (i.e.,
losses) on the DC Stock to Bank at the end of the period.57
54. Id. A specified index is a fixed rate, price or amount (which may vary by period), an
index that is based on objective financial information, or an interest rate index that is regularly
used in normal lending transactions. Id. § 1.446-3(c)(2). “[A] notional principal amount is any
specified amount of money or property that, when multiplied by a specified index, measures a
party’s rights and obligations under the [NPC], but is not borrowed or loaned between the
parties as part of the [NPC].” Id. § 1.446-3(c)(3).
55. Total return swaps have caused problems for the IRS in areas outside the tax shelter
arena. For example, the IRS has drafted an industry directive alerting its agents that some
taxpayers have used total return swaps to avoid tax with respect to certain U.S. source income.
IRS, Industry Directive on Total Return Swaps (“TRSs”) Used to Avoid Dividend Withholding
Tax, LMSB-4-1209-044 (2010) [hereinafter Industry Directive].
56. For example, borrowing $100,000 to purchase a house, and using the house as security
for the $100,000 loan.
57. Banks will often reduce or hedge their risk by purchasing the underlying stock.
Because banks can generally borrow at lower rates than their customers, banks often borrow
funds to purchase the underlying stock and profit from the difference between the amount they
pay on their borrowings and the amount they charge their customers.
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In this example, FP is in a similar position to an owner of the stock, but
with some important legal and financial differences. One such difference is
that FP does not own the stock, which means it is not deemed a shareholder,
thus not running afoul of any ownership restrictions.58 Other key differences
are that (i) FP only has a five-year position in DC stock (though FP could
extend the contract if both it and Bank agreed), and (ii) FP has also incurred
the risk that Bank will be unable to perform under the contract, deemed
“counterparty risk.”59 Absent a Bank failure, however, those differences will
have little to no impact on FP’s economic return over the five-year period.60
From a tax perspective however, FP is in a markedly different position
than had it owned the underlying stock. Ignoring for the moment the
restrictions on ownership, had FP owned the DC Stock, FP would have
been subject to U.S. withholding tax on any dividends it received on the DC
Stock.61 NPCs, however, had a different sourcing rule for dividend
payments.62 That rule had the effect of creating an unintentional tax shelter.
58. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 123, 124 (2010).
59. While usually insubstantial, the market crisis of 2008 demonstrates that such risks are
potentially significant. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 583–85 (2009). That risk can be hedged
with a credit default swap on Bank.
60. However, such differences may play a large role in the market for equities. See Jordan
M. Barry, John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers, On Derivatives Markets and Social
Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership (Becker Friedman Inst. Research
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
2011-011,
2012),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2134458. Barry, Hatfield, and Kominers
present an analysis contrasting the “prevailing view among many economists . . . that
derivatives markets simply enable [financial markets] to incorporate information better and
faster” and arguing that the separation of economic interests and corresponding voting rights
brought on by derivatives “can render financial markets unpredictable, unstable, and
inefficient.” Id. at 7.
61. See I.R.C. §§ 871, 881 (2012). U.S. withholding tax is generally imposed on certain
types of U.S. source income, including dividends paid to foreign persons. The tax rate could be
as high as 30% of such U.S. source income. Id.; see also STAFF OF U.S. S. PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE: HOW OFFSHORE
ENTITIES DODGE TAXES ON U.S. STOCK DIVIDENDS 3 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter STAFF
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/091108DividendTaxAbuse.pdf;
Lynnley
Browning, Banks’ Derivatives Activity Falls Under I.R.S Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/business/21tax.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss.
Browning notes that “[t]he instruments known as equity swaps, mimic ordinary shares and give
investors like hedge funds the benefits of stock ownership, including payments similar to
dividends, without actually owning the shares.” Id. In addition to other benefits, Browning
points to the fact that “[b]ig banks also benefit from the swaps because, under federal tax rules,
the banks may avoid paying a 30 percent tax that is normally levied on stock trades.” Id.
62. See Warren, supra note 30, at 912.
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Foreign taxpayers contemplating ownership of U.S. stocks were faced
with a choice: purchase the stock directly and face withholding tax
obligations or enter into a total return swap on the stock and escape such
obligations.63 Absent a compelling reason to actually own the stock, many
foreign investors utilized the total return swap method described above.
Thus, foreign investors were able to replicate the economic returns of
ownership without incurring substantial withholding tax obligations.
However, in 2008, Congress noted the abuses in such actions64 and, in 2010,
the IRS told its agents to examine such transactions as potentially abusive. 65
Finally, on January 19, 2012, the Treasury and the IRS released temporary
and proposed regulations subjecting certain swap payments to U.S.
withholding tax.66
While the actions of the foreign parties using total return swaps for
legitimate investment purposes may not be tantamount to a shelter, those
actions nevertheless demonstrate how certain tax rules create legitimate
opportunities for taxpayers to avoid tax using derivatives. The tax shelters
described below have no such legitimacy.

63. Foreign parties were able to avoid withholding obligations based on a 1991 Treasury
Regulation that provided that the source of any payment made pursuant to an NPC was sourced
according to the residence of the person receiving the payment. Thus, the foreign party
receiving U.S. stock dividends, according to the Treasury Regulations, was able to claim that
those U.S. stock dividends were foreign source, because the foreign party was receiving the
payment. As foreign source payments, no U.S. withholding obligations arose. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.863-7 (1991); see also Industry Directive, supra note 55.
64. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 61.
65. On January 14, 2010, the IRS issued an industry directive to identify and pursue
certain total return swap transactions that avoided U.S. withholding tax. See Industry Directive,
supra note 55.
66. On January 19, 2012, the IRS released temporary and proposed regulations addressing
the treatment of dividend equivalents, and requiring those dividend equivalent payments to be
treated as U.S. source income subject to withholding. T.D. 9572, 2012-11 I.R.B. 471–75,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb12-11.pdf. Under the temporary regulations,
swap payments made after March 18, 2012, but prior to January 1, 2013, will continue to be
subject to the existing sourcing rules contained in § 871(m). Beginning January 1, 2013,
however, payments contingent on or determined by reference to dividends on U.S. equities
made under swaps and certain other financial instruments that fall within any one of seven
categories of “specified notional principal contracts” set forth in the proposed regulations would
generally be treated as U.S. source income under § 871(m) and thus potentially subject to U.S.
withholding tax. Id.
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TAX SHELTERS USING DERIVATIVES

Before 1986, tax shelters were a dime a dozen.67 Under pre-1986 law,
taxpayers were able to offset ordinary income (like wages) with passive
losses (like depreciation). In 1986, Congress ended those shelters by
passing the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“1986 Act”), which included
limitations on taxpayers’ ability to shelter ordinary income with passive
losses.68 The 1986 Act effectively shut down those pre-1986 shelters.69
Today’s shelters, however, are not as easy to attack.
After the 1986 Act, one of the first tax-advantaged transactions to gain
widespread notoriety was a transaction structured for the Estée Lauder
family in 1994–95 (the “Lauder Family Transaction”). The Lauder Family
Transaction was based on the short against the box transaction. In a short
sale against the box,
an owner of publicly traded equity borrows the same number of
identical shares from his broker and sells them short in the market.
Usually the borrower pledges the shares he owns as collateral for
the loan of the shares used in the short sale. Thus an equity owner
can dispose of his economic risk without having to recognize gain
in the shares until the short sale is closed. A short sale against the
box is a tax deferral transaction, nothing more; yet the tax

67. Farms, particularly cattle farms, were (and still are) a popular source for tax shelters.
See, e.g., Yasha Levine, This Tax Day, ‘Farms’ Owned by the Rich Provide Massive Tax
Shelter, NATION (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/159943/tax-day-farmsowned-rich-provide-massive-tax-shelter.
68. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). I.R.C. § 469
applies to passive activity losses. The 1986 Act was a grand compromise between strange and
hostile bedfellows. On one side, there was a tax-reform, anti-loophole, base-broadening
approach, traditionally a Democratic approach. On the other side, there was a cut-the-tax-rate
approach, traditionally Republican. The 1986 Act plopped them together and cut both tax rates
and tax loopholes, broadening the base and cutting rates. See generally Calvin H. Johnson,
What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879 (1995). Such a compromise could arguably work
well in today’s tax shelter environment, but the two parties are much farther apart and any such
grand compromise seems unlikely. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Tax Reform Evidence from
1986,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
24,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204002304576629481571778262.html (noting
that “[e]xperience implies that the combination of base broadening and rate reduction would
raise revenue equal to about 4% of existing tax revenue”).
69. Andrew A. Samwick, Tax Shelters and Passive Losses After the Tax Reform Act of
1986, at 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5171, 1995) (noting that the act
resulted in a “precipitous decline in tax sheltered investments”), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5171.pdf?new_window=1.
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administrator and the courts have permitted it for decades because
of the identification rule.70

To illustrate the benefits of a short against the box (using pre-1997 law),
assume an investor owns 1,000 shares of GOOG (trading at $667 per share)
and had a zero basis in those shares. If the investor sold those shares, then
she would have to recognize $667,000 of gain.71 But if the investor
borrowed 1,000 shares and sold short those shares, the investor would have
$667,000 cash but no gain until he closed out the short.72 At that point, the
investor has $667,000 cash and two open positions for tax purposes: the
long position in GOOG stock and the short position in GOOG stock. Since
those two positions perfectly offset each other (all gains on the long
position offset losses on the short position, and vice versa), the investor has
also eliminated all risk with respect to the positions.73 Generally, the only
way to monetize a position, and eliminate risk with respect thereto, would
be selling the position. The short against the box achieved the same result as
a sale, yet without those pesky taxes.
The Lauder Family Transaction allowed Estée Lauder, the founder of the
Estée Lauder Company (“Lauder Company”) (as well as her son, Ronald
Lauder) to use a short against the box technique to, for all intents and
purposes, sell approximately 15 million shares in the Lauder Company and
avoid the tax liability generated by the sale.74 In the transaction, instead of
70. Lee A. Sheppard, Equity Swaps as an Executive Tax Shelter, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct.
24, 1994, at 266.
71. I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
72. I.R.C. § 1233 (2012). Importantly, the lender of the shares also has no risk, because
the lender would generally require the investor to post the long position as collateral. See
Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES 783, 788 (1993)
[hereinafter Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless]. Kleinbard notes that, “[a] securities borrower must
collateralize its obligation to return the borrowed securities to the lender; in a short-against-thebox, this obligation often is satisfied by the borrower/short seller posting its ‘long’ position as
collateral.” Id.
73. For every dollar increase in GOOG, the value of the investor’s long position rises, but
the value of the short position falls by the exact same amount. Alternatively, for every dollar
decrease in GOOG stock, the value of the investor’s stock position falls, but the value of the
short position rises by the exact same amount. See Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless, supra note 72,
at 789 (“[G]ain (or loss) on the investor’s long position is perfectly offset by loss (or gain) on its
short position.”).
74. The media reported that members of the Lauder family had large positions in Lauder
Company stock, but had a very low basis in that stock. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, New Tax Law
Takes
Aim
at
Estée
Lauder,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/06/business/new-tax-law-takes-aim-at-estee-lauder.html;
Allan Sloan, Lauder Family’s Stock Maneuvers Could Make a Tax Accountant Blush, WASH.
POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at D3. Therefore, if the family members sold their stock, such sales would
have generated large capital gains. In 1995, the Lauder family would have been subjected to a
28% capital gains tax. I.R.C. § 1(h) (1995).
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selling their own appreciated shares in the Lauder Company, they borrowed
shares from family members and sold those shares (i.e., they sold short the
borrowed shares).75
According to media reports at the time, the Lauders’ short against the
box transactions allowed them to defer paying between $95 and $125
million in taxes.76 However, deferral was only one goal: the transaction was
structured in such a manner that the borrowed shares would not be returned
(i.e., the short would not be closed out) until after the death of the taxpayer.
Death, being the most tax-favored event (for all except the decedent), would
allow Ms. Lauder’s (and her son’s) own shares to be revalued for tax
purposes to their fair market value at the time of their death.77
Tax shelter promoters, drunk with clients seeking to avoid taxes based on
notoriety of the Lauder Family Transaction, began aggressively using such
transactions to aid their clients in sheltering income. Congress responded to
the negative publicity surrounding the Lauder Family Transaction, as well
as the threat to the fisc, in 1997, enacting I.R.C. § 1259 as part of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.78 Section 1259’s purpose was to end the short
against the box and similar transactions.79 In enacting section 1259,
Congress required taxpayers to recognize gain (but not loss) when they
entered into a short against the box transaction (or a similar transaction)80
75. See Sloan, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 74; Sloan, supra note 74.
77. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1994) (providing “the basis of property in the hands of a
person acquiring the property from a decedent . . . shall . . . be (1) the fair market value of the
property at the date of the decedent’s death”).
78. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788; see also Susan M.
Stone, Deferring the Ultimate Makeover: Estee Lauder’s IPO Makes Capitol Hill Look Twice at
Short Sales Against the Box, 14 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS 356 (1997).
79. In the section 1259 legislative history, Congress acknowledged that under the thencurrent law (i.e., pre-section 1259):
[A] taxpayer may lock in gain on securities by entering into a ‘short sale
against the box,’ i.e., when the taxpayer owns securities that are the same as,
or substantially identical to, the securities borrowed and sold short. The form
of the transaction is respected for income tax purposes and gain on the
substantially identical property is not recognized at the time of the short sale.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN 1997, JCS-23-97, at 173 (Comm. Print 1997).
80. I.R.C. § 1259(c)(1) treats a taxpayer as having made a constructive sale of an
appreciated stock position:
[I]f the taxpayer (or a related person)—
(A) enters into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property,
(B) enters into an offsetting notional principal contract with respect to the
same or substantially identical property,
(C) enters into a futures or forward contract to deliver the same or
substantially identical property,
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with respect to an appreciated stock position.81 Congress also included
section 1259(c)(1)(E), which gave the Treasury the authority to issue
regulations if a taxpayer “enters into 1 or more other transactions (or
acquires 1 or more positions) that have substantially the same effect as”
other prescribed transactions.82 To date, the Treasury has not issued any
such regulations.83
In the section 1259 legislative history, Congress acknowledged:
[T]axpayers may engage in other arrangements, such as “futures
contracts,” “forward contracts,” “equity swaps” and other
“notional principal contracts” where the risk of loss and
opportunity for gain with respect to property are shifted to another
party. . . . These arrangements do not result in the recognition of
gain by the taxpayer.84

(D) in the case of an appreciated financial position that is a short sale or a
contract described in subparagraph (B) or (C) with respect to any property,
acquires the same or substantially identical property, or
(E) to the extent prescribed by the Secretary in regulations, enters into 1 or
more other transactions (or acquires 1 or more positions) that have
substantially the same effect as a transaction described in any of the
preceding subparagraphs.
I.R.C. §1259(c) (2012); see also David M. Schizer, Financial Instruments: Special Rules, BNA
TAX MGM’T PORTFOLIOS, at pt. III-A Constructive Sales Under § 1259 (noting that “substitutes
for short sales against the box have become more widely available in the over-the-counter
derivatives market, which matured during the 1980s and 1990s. [Options, forwards and swaps]
can be used as hedges, for instance, when a short sale violates the securities laws.”) (last
updated Feb. 13, 2013).
81. I.R.C. § 1259(b)(1) defines an appreciated position in stock as “any position with
respect to any stock . . . if there would be gain were such position sold, assigned, or otherwise
terminated at its fair market value.” I.R.C. § 1259(b)(1) (2012).
82. I.R.C. § 1259(c)(1)(E) (2012). It was well understood at the time that other
transactions could be used that would have the same effect of a short against the box. See
Edward Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation’s Newest Challenge to the
Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1358–59 (1991).
83. Despite Treasury inaction, a general rule of thumb has emerged in the tax bar that a
hedge using options must allow for a spread of at least 20% on the price of a stock (e.g., an inthe-money put struck at 120% of the purchase price or a collar struck at 95% and 115% of the
purchase price) to avoid the constructive sales rules of I.R.C. § 1259. See, e.g., Eric D. Chason,
Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo: A Reappraisal of Option Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 135,
186–191 (2007); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1312, 1343 (2001) [hereinafter Schizer, Frictions]; Richard O. Loengard, Jr., NYSBA
Reports on Proposed Constructive Sale Legislation, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 103-11 (1997).
84. The I.R.C. § 1259 legislator also suggested approaches the Treasury might take in
crafting such regulations, noting:
[It is] anticipated that the Treasury regulations, when issued, will provide
specific standards for determining whether several common transactions will
be treated as constructive sales. . . .
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That legislative history also suggested that section 1259(c)(1)(E) was
aimed at transactions that eliminated “substantially all of the taxpayer’s risk
of loss and opportunity for income or gain with respect to [an] appreciated
financial position.”85 The gap between “all” and “substantially all” has been
a boon for the tax shelter industry. Into that gap stepped the tax promoters
with the variable prepaid forward.
A.

The Variable Prepaid Forward

On the heels of the Lauder Family Transaction (and Congress’ reaction
to it), many wealthy taxpayers sought other more-or-less legitimate ways to
avoid tax on their appreciated stock positions. One of the more popular
methods has been the variable prepaid forward contract, which is nothing
more than a less (but still remarkably) efficient short against the box. As
reported by the New York Times in 2008, the variable prepaid forward

In order to determine whether collars have substantially the same effect
as the transactions specified in the provision, the Congress anticipated that
Treasury regulations will provide specific standards that take into account
various factors with respect to the appreciated financial position, including
its volatility. It is expected that several aspects of the collar transaction will
be relevant, including the spread between the put and call prices, the period
of the transaction, and the extent to which the taxpayer retains the right to
periodic payments on the appreciated financial position (e.g., the dividends
on collared stock). The Congress intended that the Treasury regulations with
respect to collars will be applied prospectively, except in cases to prevent
abuse.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 79, at 177–78. The committee also noted:
For collars, options and some other transactions, one approach that
Treasury might take in issuing regulations is to rely on option prices and
option pricing models . . . Thus, option pricing offers one model for
quantifying both the total risk of loss and opportunity for gain with respect to
an appreciated financial position, as well as the proportions of these total
amounts that the taxpayer has retained. In addition to setting specific
standards for treatment of these and other transactions, it may be appropriate
for Treasury regulations to establish ‘safe harbor’ rules for common financial
transactions that do not result in constructive sale treatment.
Id. at 178.
85. H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 442 (1997) (emphasis added); see also JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, supra note 79, at 177. This language appears to be adopted from Treasury’s initial
constructive sale proposal. This proposal targeted hedges that “substantially eliminate[d] risk of
loss and opportunity for gain.” See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury’s General Explanation of
Administration Revenue Proposals, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-9 (1996). Congress ultimately
enacted an alternative proposal offered by Representative Kennelly that lists the four specific
categories and a catch-all. See H.R. 846, 105th Cong. (1997).
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contract is “one of the most widely used in corporate America. The unpaid
taxes associated with it are likely to total billions of dollars a year.”86
The variable prepaid forward is attractive to taxpayers holding large
appreciated stock positions. A quick review of PNC Bank’s website shows
the ubiquity of the product. For example, PNC Financial Service’s website
states:
Use a prepaid forward contract to receive from 75 to 85% of your
stock’s value in cash. If you’d like to realize the value of your
concentrated stock holding and generate cash without selling your
stock, making interest payments on a loan or subjecting yourself to
borrowing restrictions based on how you plan to use the funds, a
prepaid forward contract may be the solution you need.87

Here is how the variable prepaid forward works. The taxpayer agrees to
sell some variable amount (usually from 80% to 100%) of his appreciated
stock position to a financial institution at some time in the future. The
financial institution pays a portion of the sales price up front to the taxpayer
but has no real risk in the transaction because the taxpayer agrees to post the
stock as collateral.88 In entering the prepaid forward, the taxpayer has
monetized and eliminated the risk of loss with respect to at least 80% of the
appreciated stock position. So why does the taxpayer not have to recognize
income on that 80%? Because in “2003, apparently unaware that an
increasing number of the prepaid forward contracts involved share lending,
the IRS declared them valid.”89
In Revenue Ruling 2003-7, the IRS ruled that as long as the taxpayer was
permitted to deliver either cash or shares at settlement, and the exact
86. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Wonders if Stock Deal Is Tax Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/business/11tax.html; see also Jesse Drucker, How
to Pay No Taxes: 10 Strategies Used by the Rich, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-17/how-to-pay-no-taxes-10-strategies-used-bythe-rich [hereinafter Drucker, No Taxes].
87. Prepaid
Forward
Contract,
PNC,
https://www.pnc.com/webapp/unsec/ProductsAndService.do?siteArea=/PNC/Home/Personal/In
vestments+and+Wealth+Management/Wealth+Management+and+Advice/Asset+Management/
Strategies+for+Concentrated+Equity+Positions/Prepaid+Forward+Contract (last visited Feb.
25, 2013).
88. The financial institution often borrows the shares from the taxpayer and immediately
sells them short. In doing so, the financial institution accomplished two complementary goals: it
generates the cash needed to pay the taxpayer (by selling the borrowed shares short) and
eliminates any risk with respect to the transaction. That risk is eliminated because any loss on
the prepaid forward contract (because the shares lose value) is offset by its short sale.
89. Browning, supra note 86. A 2003 IRS revenue ruling provided that if the taxpayer was
permitted to substitute cash for delivery of shares at settlement, the prepaid forward contract
would not require the taxpayer to recognize income up front, but would only recognize income
when the prepaid forward contract closed. See Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363.
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amount of shares to be delivered at settlement could not be determined, the
variable prepaid forward contract would not require the taxpayer to
recognize income up front, but would only recognize income when the
prepaid forward contract closed.90 Belatedly, in 2006, the IRS sought to unring the bell by issuing a Technical Advice Memorandum declaring
particular types of variable prepaid forward contracts invalid.91
The IRS has enjoyed recent success attacking the more aggressive
variable prepaid forward contracts.92 While there is little publicly available
information about individual IRS settlements, one case for which there is
public information is instructive. In 2011, Clear Channel Communications,
Inc.’s co-founder, Billy Joe McCombs, settled his $45 million potential tax
liability for $23 million, based on his use of variable prepaid forward
contracts he entered in 2002 and 2003.93 From McCombs’ perspective, the
strategy was successful: even in defeat, he deferred paying $23 million in
taxes for nine years, and escaped paying taxes altogether for the remaining
$22 million asserted by the IRS. While he was required to pay interest on
the underpayment, those interest payments are hardly a deterrent for many
taxpayers.94
90. See Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363.
91. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200604033 (Jan. 27, 2006) (concluding that “when Taxpayer
has loaned shares to Counterparty that were originally pledged to the Counterparty, and the
Counterparty disposed of the shares, the cumulative effects of the agreement result in a current
sale of shares for tax purposes, notwithstanding Rev. Rul. 2003–7, 2003–1 C.B. 363”).
92. See Jeremiah Coder, More Taxpayers Settling Their Variable Prepaid Forward
Contract Cases, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 4, 2012, at 66.
93. See Janet Novack, IRS Demands $45 Million from Billionaire McCombs, FORBES (July
27, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/27/billy-mccombs-anschutz-capital-gainspersonal-finance-billionaire-mccombs-fights-irs.html. According to the article, the IRS asserted:
[McCombes] should have reported $213.4 million in long-term capital gains
in 2002 from the sale of 11.3 million shares of Clear Channel
Communications Inc., the company he cofounded in 1972. He’s also
disputing an additional $3.3 million in 2003 capital gains in connection with
the same purported sale. In all, the IRS asserts, McCombs had $245 million
in taxable income for 2002 and 2003, rather than the $18 million he reported
and owed $53 million in income tax, not the $8 million he paid.
Id.; see also Jeremiah Coder, Practitioners Seek Clarity on Stock Lending After Anschutz, TAX
NOTES TODAY, July 25, 2011, at 342, 345; Drucker, No Taxes, supra note 86; Jesse Drucker,
Billionaires Can Avoid Reporting Gains on Stocks, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2011, 4:13 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/USCP/PNI/NEWS/2011-11-24-bcbillionairetaxes_ST_U.htm;
Robert Frank, The Billionaire’s Tax Loophole, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:24 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2011/11/22/the-billionaires-tax-loophole/.
94. Under the Code, the interest rate on underpayments, late payments, or nonpayments of
tax equals the federal short-term rate plus three percentage points. I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) (2012).
The federal short-term rate is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with
I.R.C. § 1274(d). I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(C)(i) directs the Secretary to set the short-term rate based
on the market yield of U.S. obligations with less than three years remaining before maturity.
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The similarity between the variable prepaid forward contract and the
short against the box should be obvious: in both cases, taxpayers monetized
a significant portion of an appreciated stock position, eliminated much of
the risk with respect to that position, and avoided income tax. While the
government has stepped up its efforts in combating variations of the prepaid
forward transaction, taxpayers have pressed on, using even more complex
transactions to create what, at their core, are derivatives-based versions of
short against the box transactions.
B.

More Sophisticated Structures

“It’s simple ain’t it, but quite clever.”95
Variable prepaid forwards presented a challenge to the IRS because the
investor had at least some “skin in the game,” i.e., the investor retained
some meaningful opportunity for gain or loss when the variable prepaid
forward contract terminated. In the wake of the IRS’s difficulty in
challenging those transactions, and the government’s limited ad hoc steps
toward changing the law and closing the transaction down, tax shelter
promoters created one of the first large-scale tax shelters using short against
the box principles, known as the Bond Option Sales Strategy (“BOSS”)
Transaction.96 Unlike the variable prepaid forward transaction, BOSS was a
tax shelter, because its main purpose, rather than sheltering gains on stock,
was to create phantom losses that could be used to shelter various other
kinds of income.
The BOSS Transaction purportedly allowed taxpayers to claim phantom
losses based on a contribution to, and distribution from, a newly created
Such interest, however, often fails to act as a deterrent, because for many taxpayers entering into
tax shelters, their ability to generate economic returns on the money they do not pay the
government far exceeds the interest cost they have to pay to the government. See, e.g., George
Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 657, 686 (1985) (noting that then-current interest rates on underpayments were
“so low that taxpayers were tempted to take risky positions with the assurance that even if they
lost in the long run they could profit immensely from temporarily investing the government’s
money”).
95. ERIC B. & RAKIM, Move the Crowd, on PAID IN FULL (4th & B’way Records 1987).
96. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. Fin., Grassley, Baucus Release Details of
Plans to Ensure Continued Son of Boss Enforcement (July 23, 2004) (noting that the IRS and
Treasury Department were aware of the BOSS transaction, and that the “transaction that was
being marketed to taxpayers for the purpose of generating articialtax losses”), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=c1706ce6-0955-4528-9d8832a943317179.
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foreign company.97 The IRS effectively shut down the BOSS Transaction in
1999 by publishing Notice 99-59, and later Notice 2000-44, which
designated the BOSS Transaction as a “Listed Transaction.”98 As a Listed
Transaction, the BOSS Transaction was also a “Reportable Transaction,”
which forced taxpayers to report their participation in any Listed
Transactions or face penalties.99 The Treasury estimated that BOSS
Transactions would have contributed to a loss to the Treasury of up to $80
billion over a ten-year period.100 A simplified version of the BOSS
Transaction operated as follows:101

97. See I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761.
98. Id. The Notice advised taxpayers that the BOSS structure, the described variations, and
substantially similar transactions would be considered as abusive tax shelters that would be
challenged by the IRS in court. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2010) (defining a listed
transaction as “a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of
transactions that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has determined to be a tax avoidance
transaction and identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed
transaction”).
99. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (2010). The regulation defined transactions as
including all the factual elements for the expected tax treatment of any investment, entity, plan,
or arrangement, and any steps needed to execute a plan. Id. The regulation went on to add that
there are six categories of reportable transactions: listed transactions, confidential transactions,
transactions with contractual protection, loss transactions, transactions with a significant booktax difference, and transactions involving a brief asset holding period. Id. § 1.6011-4(b); see
also I.R.C. § 6707A (2012) (noting that “[a]ny person who fails to include on any return or
statement any information with respect to a reportable transaction which is required under
section 6011 to be included with such return or statement shall pay a penalty in the amount
determined under subsection (b)”). I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1) defines reportable transactions.
According to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”), the
penalty was enacted for failure to disclose a reportable transaction, with the intent of helping to
detect, deter, and shut down abusive tax shelter activity. However, the procedures for
documenting and assessing the penalty were not sufficient or formalized, and cases are not fully
developed. These conditions increase the risk that taxpayers will not receive consistent and fair
treatment. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., PENALTY CASES FOR FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE REPORTABLE TRANSACTIONS WERE NOT ALWAYS FULLY DEVELOPED, No. 2011-30004
(2010),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201130004fr.pdf.
100. Christopher Bergin, Corporate Shelters Are Serious Threat to System, Summers Says,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000 (quoting Lawrence H. Summers, Treasury Secretary). At the
annual Section of Taxation of the Federal Bar Association conference on February 28, 2000,
Secretary Summers announced new disclosure regulations to combat the growing corporate tax
shelter problem. Id. Summers further noted that there was little doubt as to the strong increase in
abusive tax shelters. Id. He reported that the cessation of lease-in and lease-out transactions and
liquidating REIT transactions along with BOSS transactions combined to save taxpayers almost
$80 billion over 10 years. Id.
101. See I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-52 C.B. 761, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/notice_1999-59.pdf; see also Michael S. Powlen & Raj Tanden, Corporate Tax Shelters or
Plus ça Change, Plus C’est la Meme Chose, in PRACTISING LAW INST., TAX STRATEGIES FOR
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Step 1
A U.S. taxpayer formed a partnership (TP) that contributed $100X
to a foreign corporation (FC) formed for the purpose of carrying
out the deal. In return, TP received the FC common stock, valued
at $100X. Another party, generally an entity formed by the
promoter (Promoter), then contributed additional capital ($40X) to
FC in exchange for FC preferred stock. FC then borrows an
additional $100X from a bank and secures the loan with $100X of
securities purchased with the funds contributed by TP and
Promoter. At that point, from an accounting perspective, FC had:
(i) $240X of assets, consisting of the securities purchased with the
$100X contributed by TP and the $40X contributed by Promoter
(collectively worth $140X) and the $100X borrowed from the
bank;
(ii) $100X of liabilities, consisting of the $100X of debt owed to
bank; and
(iii) $140X of equity, consisting of $100X FC common stock plus
$40X FC preferred stock.
Step 2
Thereafter, FC distributes the $100X of securities to TP with an
implicit agreement that FC will pay off the $100X of debt that
encumbered the securities. At that point, from an accounting
perspective, FC had:
(i) $140X of assets, consisting of $100X of cash and $40X of
securities;
(ii) $100X of liabilities; and
(iii) $40X of equity.

To create the intended tax benefits, the taxpayer takes two inconsistent
positions with respect to how the transaction should be treated for tax
purposes. First, that the $100X of securities distributed by FC to TP were
worthless because those securities were subject to $100X of bank debt—
even though all parties anticipated and expected FC would pay the $100X
of bank debt. The second position is a bit more involved: in the second
position, TP claimed that the $100X of FC common stock it owned became
worthless once it received the $100X of securities that was distributed by
FC. After that distribution, as noted in Step 2 above, FC was left with assets
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS,
REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 9, 19 (2001).
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of $140X, equal to $100X borrowed from the bank and $40X of securities,
liabilities of $100X, resulting in an equity value of only $40X. Because the
preferred stock had priority over the common stock, the taxpayer argued
that there was no value left to assign to the common stock, making that
stock—at least from an accounting perspective—worthless.
In essence, TP claimed in position one that the distributed securities were
worthless because the value of those securities was offset by the debt; but in
position two claimed the distributed securities were worth $100X when
distributed because the value of those securities was not offset by the debt,
making the FC common stock worthless. Based on the second position (that
the FC common stock was worthless), TP took the position that it could be
treated as having disposed of the stock, pursuant to certain IRS elections.102
Since TP initially had a $100X basis in the FC stock, based on TP’s initial
contribution of $100X for the stock, when it took the position that the stock
was worthless, TP claimed a $100X loss on the disposition of the FC stock,
which was the entire purpose of the transaction. TP would then use that loss
to offset other income.
Though far from obvious, BOSS was based on short against the box
principles. In BOSS, the promoters created a company that only had simple
assets and liabilities and used the tax laws to create different treatments for
combined positions. In the short against the box transaction, the promoters
were creating optionality by combining borrowed shares with shares sold
short to create an effective sale for an economic purpose (monetizing the
position and eliminating risk, i.e., the same things accomplished by a sale)
but not for tax purposes (no gain recognition). In BOSS, the optionality was
created by combining stock with debt to set the value of the stock to zero
for one purpose (deeming the stock worthless and generating a tax loss) but
full value for another (not requiring the taxpayer to include gain).
While the contrary positions taken by taxpayers in the BOSS Transaction
appear illogical, the tax treatment of those positions was arguably mandated
by the Code.103 The IRS attacked the BOSS Transaction in Notice 99-59,

Id.

102. I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-52 C.B. 761. In the Notice, the IRS stated:
The deemed disposition of the stock may be based upon an election under
§ 301.7701–3(c) of the [U.S. Treasury Regulations] to change the federal
income tax classification of the foreign corporation from a corporation to a
partnership, giving rise to a deemed liquidation of the foreign corporation, or
by treating the partnership as a trader in securities which elects under
§ 475(f) to treat the securities that it holds, including the stock of the foreign
corporation, as having been sold for their fair market value on the last
business day of the taxable year.
103. In I.R.S. Notice 99-59, the IRS discussed the taxpayer’s position in BOSS, noting that:
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arguing that the taxpayers’ claimed losses lacked economic substance and
thus would not be allowable.104 In Announcement 2005-80, the IRS
permitted taxpayers who had participated in the BOSS Transaction (as well
as a number of other tax shelters) to settle their cases and pay all of the
taxes owed, interest, and a 10% underpayment penalty.105 While the IRS
effectively shut down the BOSS Transaction, relying on the economic
substance doctrine, it failed to offer an explicit technical analysis of the
financial tax positions.106 Tax shelter promoters took that failure as an
invitation, signaling to them that so long as they could add a fig leaf of an

Id.

[T]he parties take the position, pursuant to § 301(b)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, that the amount of the distribution is zero for purposes of
§ 301. On that theory, no part of the distribution is treated either as a
dividend or as a reduction of stock basis under § 301(c). The partnership is
treated as having subsequently disposed of the stock of the foreign
corporation, giving rise to a tax loss equal to the excess of the partnership’s
original basis in the stock ($100x in the example) over the fair market value
of the common stock after the distribution of securities (zero). The deemed
disposition of the stock may be based upon an election under § 301.7701–
3(c) of the regulations to change the federal income tax classification of the
foreign corporation from a corporation to a partnership, giving rise to a
deemed liquidation of the foreign corporation, or by treating the partnership
as a trader in securities which elects under § 475(f) to treat the securities that
it holds, including the stock of the foreign corporation, as having been sold
for their fair market value on the last business day of the taxable year.

104. See id. In the Notice, the IRS explained that only bona fide and actual economic
consequence constitutes an allowable loss deduction. Id. at 761–62. However, the losses
taxpayers claim for capital expenditures they already recovered lack economic substance to be
an allowable deduction for federal income tax purposes. Id. The common law economic
substance doctrine originated with Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), and continued to
evolve through cases too numerous to cite. The common law doctrine held that if a transaction
lacked economic substance, then its tax consequences would not be upheld. While what
constituted “economic substance” was often hard to define precisely, “[f]rom a financial
economic perspective, economic substance is commonly regarded as transactions that present
the prospect of a reasonable degree of risk and reward absent tax considerations.” Alan L.
Tucker, Son of BOSS, 15 J. DERIVATIVES 74, 75 (2008). In the Notice, the IRS also indicated
that the transaction may be subject to challenge under a litany of other Code provisions,
“including but not limited to §§ 269, 301, 331, 446, 475, 482, 752, and 1001.” I.R.S. Notice 9959, 1999-52 C.B. 761, 762.
105. I.R.S. Announcement 2005-80, 2005-46 I.R.B. 967. For a discussion of the penalty,
see id. § 4(E)(1), at 969, referencing id. § 3(6), at 968.
106. The IRS only noted that “[t]he purported tax benefits from these transactions may also
be subject to challenge under other provisions of the Code and regulations, including but not
limited to [I.R.C.] §§ 269, 301, 331, 446, 475, 482, 752, and 1001 of the Code.” I.R.S. Notice
99-59, 1999-52 C.B. 761, 762.
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economic justification or a profit motive, the transaction would “work.”
Into that gap stepped even more sophisticated structures.107
The BOSS Transaction exploited how combined financial positions (in
BOSS, a stock position and a loan) were valued for tax purposes to generate
tax losses. The IRS was successful in attacking the transaction because the
positions taken by the taxpayer, and the entire transaction itself, were so
clearly devoid of substance. However, the lesson of combining financial
positions to make tax mischief was not lost on tax shelter promoters.
Fresh off the heels of the BOSS Transaction and the IRS attack thereon,
creative tax attorneys and financial professionals devised a more
sophisticated offspring of the BOSS Transaction using derivatives. That
transaction, aptly entitled “Son of Boss” became arguably the costliest tax
shelter in U.S. history.108
The IRS characterized the Son of Boss as “a highly sophisticated,
technically complex, no-risk scheme designed to generate tax losses without
corresponding economic risks that was promoted by some prominent firms
in the financial services industry to investors seeking to shelter large gains
from the sale of a business or capital asset.”109 A quick review of Lexis
reveals over 84 reported Son of Boss cases, one of which, United States v.
Home Concrete,110 was recently decided in the taxpayer’s favor by the U.S.
Supreme Court.111 In addition, the Republican presidential candidate in the
107. The structures described herein were complex, not only for the financial machinations,
but also to make it more difficult for the IRS to discover such transactions. See, e.g., Tanina
Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J.
ON REG. 77, 87–88 (2006). Rostain states:
It was also difficult for the Service to discover tax shelters in connection with
the returns it did audit. Corporate tax returns typically run into the thousands
of pages. Tax shelters, moreover, are complex transactions usually involving
types of deductions or credits that can be claimed legitimately. Tax shelter
purchasers had strong incentives not to signal their participation on their
returns since, before 2004, the failure to disclose did not affect whether the
penalty for substantial understatement of tax liabilities applied.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, Did Romney Enable a Company’s
Abusive
Tax
Shelter?,
CNN
OPINION
(Aug.
9,
2012,
6:24
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/08/opinion/canellos-kleinbard-romney-taxes/ (“Son of Boss and
its related shelters represented perhaps the largest tax avoidance scheme in history, costing the
U.S. many billions in lost corporate tax revenues.”).
109. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 2.
110. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
111. The taxpayer in Home Concrete did not win on the merits of the Son of Boss shelter,
but rather on a tortured interpretation of the statute of limitations the IRS sought to impose on
the taxpayer. Id. at 1839. The primary issue before the Supreme Court in Home Concrete is
whether the IRS was correct in extending the statute of limitations for Son of Boss transactions.
In addition, “[t]here are about 30 docketed cases awaiting the outcome of [Home Concrete] with
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2012 presidential election approved a Son of Boss transaction while serving
as chair of the audit committee of a Fortune 500 company’s board of
directors.112
Below is a brief explanation of how the option variant form of the Son of
Boss shelter was structured for a hypothetical taxpayer (“Taxpayer X”) who
had $100 million of capital gains to shelter.113 In a highly simplified
example, the Son of Boss shelter worked as follows:
Taxpayer X entered into seemingly offsetting transactions purchasing
$100 million of call options on ABC stock (“Position 1”) and
simultaneously selling $99.9 million of nearly (but not quite) identical call
options on the same ABC stock (“Position 2”). The total economic cost to
Taxpayer X of Position 1 and Position 2 is $100,000 ($100 million cost of
Position 1 minus $99.9 million proceeds from Position 2). Taxpayer X then
transfers both Position 1 and Position 2 (collectively, the “Positions”) to a
partnership (the “SOB Partnership”) in exchange for an SOB Partnership
interest.114 Soon after contributing the Positions to the SOB Partnership,
the government aiming to recover $1 billion in taxes, interest and penalties, according to court
documents.” See Patrick Temple-West, “Son of Boss” Crackdown Lands in Supreme Court,
REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us-usa-tax-courtidUSTRE80C1UC20120113.
112. See Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 291 (2008); Lee A.
Sheppard, Your Mitt Romney Tax Issues Cheat Sheet, 136 TAX NOTES 754 (2012) (“Marriott tax
shelter. Issue: Was it proper? No. Marriott International entered into a son-of-BOSS deal while
Romney was chair of the audit committee of its board. The company lost a court case
challenging the shelter on a motion for summary judgment.”)..
113. The Son of Boss tax shelter was structured in various ways. In its Notice discussing
the Son of Boss transaction, the IRS acknowledges that the transaction has different variations.
See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 C.B. 255. One group of investors who were targeted by Son
of Boss promoters were hedge fund investors, who, through what many describe as a tax
loophole, structure their earnings from managing hedge funds into carried interest, which, under
current law, are treated as capital gains. See Randall Dodd, Tax Breaks for Billionaires:
Loophole for Hedge Fund Managers Costs Billions in Tax Revenue, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July
24, 2007), http://www.epi.org/publication/pm120/.
114. This Article purposefully ignores the non-derivative aspects of the shelters discussed
herein, unless otherwise noted. This analysis simplifies the mechanism by which the taxpayer is
able to claim the loss. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 104, at 75. Tucker states:
In the Son of BOSS strategy the “transfer” of the manufactured capital
loss to the taxpayer was itself a bit of ingenious financial engineering. The
taxpayer first formed a single-member limited liability company (LLC)
before buying and writing the options. It was the LLC that became a partner
in the aforementioned newly created general partnership vehicle. An S
corporation was then created. The LLC contributed its interest in the general
partnership to the S corporation in exchange for stock. The partnership
terminated, the options expired, the S corporation’s assets were then sold
(technically the triggering event that occasioned the capital loss), and the loss
passed to the investor, i.e., the stock was deemed worthless.
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Taxpayer X sells his partnership interest for its true economic value,
approximately $100,000.
1.

Tax Benefits

As described by the promoters of the transaction, upon contributing the
Positions to the SOB Partnership, Taxpayer X could claim a basis in his
partnership interest of $100 million, not $100,000. The Promoter relied on
an interpretation of section 752 for that position, which purportedly allowed
Taxpayer X to claim that his basis in the SOB Partnership should be
increased by the cost of the purchased call options (Position 1) but not
reduced by the sold call options (Position 2) due to the SOB Partnership’s
assumption of the taxpayer’s obligation with respect to the written call
options.115 In that respect, Son of Boss clearly mirrored BOSS in treating
one position differently for tax purposes than economic reality would
suggest is the correct treatment. As a result, when Taxpayer X sells the
partnership interest for $100,000 (its true economic value), he claims a
$99.9 million loss, the difference between his $100 million tax basis and his
$100,000 of proceeds from the sale of his SOB Partnership interest.116 By
entering into the Son of Boss shelter, Taxpayer X generated a $99.9 million
loss to offset his pre-existing $100 million of capital gains income, and,
instead of reporting $100 million in capital gains income (and paying $15

Id.; see also Paul Braverman, Helter Shelter, LAW.COM (Dec. 5, 2003),
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1069170446899; Paul Braverman, The COBRA Uncoiled,
LAW.COM (Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005537317. COBRA
stands for “Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives,” which is a nominal variant of the
Son of BOSS strategy.
115. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 C.B. 255; see alsoTucker, supra note 104, at 74.
Tucker explains:
Key to the Son of BOSS strategy was its utilization of what was then Section
752 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). A technical interpretation of I.R.C.
§ 752 permitted a partnership to assume a taxpayer’s previously established
positions in option trades, with long positions being treated as assets and
short positions being treated as contingent liabilities. Within the partnership,
the contingent liabilities were ascribed a zero value under section 752, which
in turn created for the taxpayer an artificially high basis in the partnership.
Id. Son of Boss also relied on a U.S. Tax Court case, Helmer v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 727
(T.C. 1975), which held that liabilities created by short option positions are too contingent to
affect a partner’s basis in a partnership. As a result, the taxpayer’s basis in its partnership
interest is equal to the value of the long options position and not offset by the short options
position.
116. There are myriad other tax issues involved in the Son of Boss shelter. This example
seeks only to highlight the primary tax issue involved.
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million in capital gains taxes), Taxpayer X would report only $100,000 in
capital gains income and pay $15,000 in capital gains taxes.117
The Son of Boss shelter, with its use of offsetting positions to create tax
benefits, hews closely to the lessons of not only the BOSS transaction, but
also the short against the box transactions. Son of Boss used the phantom
loss concept of the BOSS transaction and the offsetting position from the
short against the box transactions to become one of the most “successful”
tax shelters in history.
2.

IRS Response

In Notice 2000-44, the IRS announced that it would deny taxpayers the
purported losses resulting from the Son of Boss Shelter.118 The IRS argued
that the losses generated by the shelter did not “represent bona fide losses
reflecting actual economic consequences as required for the purposes of §
165.”119 Notice 2000-44 also informed taxpayers and promoters that
appropriate penalties may be imposed on participants in such transactions
and warned that taxpayers and promoters who participated in these
transactions and willfully concealed their efforts on tax returns may be
subject to criminal penalties.120
On May 5, 2004, in Announcement 2004-46 (the “SOB Settlement
Initiative”) the IRS announced that it would allow taxpayers who
participated in Son of Boss shelters to settle with the IRS. Pursuant to the
SOB Settlement Initiative, taxpayers electing to settle would concede all
claimed tax benefits and attributes of the transaction but would be allowed
to treat (i) their net out-of-pocket costs and fees as a long-term capital loss,
or (ii) one-half of their net out-of-pocket costs and fees as an ordinary loss,
in the year those costs and fees were paid or accrued. In addition, the IRS
provided penalty relief for shelter participants.
Particularly, taxpayers who voluntarily disclosed their participation in
Son of Boss shelters pursuant to Announcement 2002-2 were not required
to pay any penalties upon settlement. However, those who failed to come
forward pursuant to Announcement 2002-2 were required to pay a
mandatory penalty of either (i) 10% of the underpayment of tax attributable
to the Son of Boss shelter for those for whom the Son of Boss shelter was
their first and only abusive tax shelter investment; or (ii) 20% of the

117.
118.
119.
120.

Tax rate for capital gains during the period was 15%. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2008).
See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255.
Id.
See id.
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underpayment for those who have participated in other abusive transactions
listed by the IRS.121
So why did the IRS offer such a generous settlement? Possibly because it
believed it faced the risk of loss for a transaction that had, as one author
noted, put “lipstick on [the] pig.”122 It is certainly plausible that the
government did not ask for all of the tax (and offered penalty relief) because
121. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-2, 2002-2 I.R.B. 304. Pursuant to Announcement 2002–2,
the IRS sought to:
encourage taxpayers to disclose their tax treatment of tax shelters and other
items for which the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty may be
appropriate if there is an underpayment of tax. If a taxpayer discloses any
item in accordance with the provisions of this announcement before April 23,
2002, the IRS will waive the accuracy related penalty under § 6662(b)(1),
(2), (3), and (4) for any underpayment of tax.
The IRS further announced that taxpayers not participating in the settlement should expect
to receive a statutory notice of deficiency (called a “90-day letter”) disallowing all losses and
out-of-pocket costs, and asserting the maximum level of penalties. The IRS states that in order
to achieve uniformity and enhance overall compliance with the tax laws, taxpayers will not be
afforded traditional administrative appeals rights, by and through the IRS Appeals Office.
Commissioner Mark W. Everson stated that the IRS is “taking this unusual step because of the
severity of the abuse.” IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb added that “(t)axpayers should not
expect to settle court cases on terms more favorably than those offered in the IRS settlement
initiative.” See IRS Offers Settlement for Son of Boss Tax Shelter, IR-2004-64, IRS, (May 5,
2004), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offers-Settlement-for-Son-of-Boss-Tax-Shelter. One author
took a different view of the reason the IRS settlement included penalties. Cf. Lee A. Sheppard,
11 Rules for Defending Tax Shelter Cases,122 TAX NOTES 176, 177 (2009) [hereinafter
Sheppard, 11 Rules]. Sheppard states:
The son-of-BOSS settlement offer foolishly included penalties, because the
IRS was on the warpath. The IRS was operating from the view that the
taxpayers owed a 40 percent valuation understatement penalty, and so a 20
percent penalty was a discount. The IRS did not count on well-heeled
taxpayers being willing to wait it out.
Id.
122. See Sheppard, 11 Rules, supra note 121, at 176–77. Sheppard notes that “Lipstick on
[the] pig” refers to a transaction having enough plausible business purpose for a judge to find in
favor of a taxpayer in a tax shelter. One such Son of Boss shelter case was Sala v. United States,
552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008). As one author noted:
the taxpayer invested in foreign currency options and contributed them to a
partnership managed by renowned foreign currency trader, Andrew Krieger.
The amount of losses generated by the transactions at issue coincidentally
offset a huge slug of income the taxpayer had in 2000 (approximately $60
million). Despite the government’s best efforts, the court found for the
taxpayer, holding that the transactions possessed economic substance. The
court also rejected the government’s attempt to retroactively apply
regulations that reject the Helmer decision.
Miller Chevalier, Tenth Circuit Engaged in Lengthy Deliberation in Sala, APPELLATE TAX
BLOG (July 23, 2010), http://appellatetax.com/2010/07/23/tenth-circuit-engaged-in-lengthydeliberation-in-sala/. The government lost the Sala case at trial, but eventually won on appeal to
the Tenth Circuit. See Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010).
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of the risk that some taxpayer would win a case, thus creating a playbook
for how to successfully complete a Son of Boss shelter.As I argue in Part
IV, that Settlement Initiative and other similar public tax shelter settlements
have resulted in taxpayers generating positive returns based on their
participation in the shelter. As a result, rather than discouraging taxpayers’
participation in shelters, such settlements have provided taxpayers with a
strong economic incentive to play the tax shelter game.
In addition to offering settlement, the government began challenging Son
of Boss shelters in audit and in litigation. On the merits, the government
won the majority of those cases.123 The IRS and the Treasury also sought to
use their regulatory power to combat the Son of Boss shelters by giving the
IRS more time to find participants in the shelter. Here, the government did
not fare as well.
Generally, the IRS has only three years to assess back taxes.124 As a
result, unless the taxpayer agreed to waive the statute of limitations, the
government had to identify the transaction, determine why it violated the
law, and assess taxes on Son of Boss shelters within three years of the
taxpayer’s first tax return claiming benefits of the shelter. However, the
government sought to use a loophole of its own to extend the statute of
limitations to six years or longer, relying on a tortured reinterpretation of
the law that had been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Colony v.
Commissioner125 in 1958.126
Pursuant to section 6501(e)(1)(A), if a taxpayer omits from gross income
an amount that exceeds 25% of the amount of gross income stated on the
return, the government is permitted to use a longer, six-year statute of
limitations to challenge a taxpayer’s return.127 In Colony, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the words “omits from gross income an amount properly
includible therein” refers to situations in which specific items of income are
123. Jeremiah Coder, Fifth Circuit Adopts Majority View of Economics Substance
Doctrine, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 26, 2009, at 94-1. In only a few instances did the
government lose Son of Boss shelter cases based on the taxpayer convincing a trial court that
the Son of Boss shelter had sufficient economic substance, and in many of those cases, the
government later won on appeal. Sala was one such case. See supra note 122.
124. Under I.R.C. § 6501(a), in most cases, the IRS has three years from the later of the
date in which a return is due or was filed to assess additional tax. However, in cases in which a
taxpayer omits from gross income an amount that exceeds 25% of the amount of gross income
stated on the return, the assessment period is extended to six years. See I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)
(2012).
125. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
126. Id.
127. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2012). The Colony decision interpreted § 275(c) of the 1939
Code, the predecessor to § 6501(e)(1)(A), the authority for the statute of limitations at issue.
Colony v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958).
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left out of the computation of gross income, and they do not apply to errors
in the computation of gross income resulting from a mistaken overstatement
of the property’s basis.128 In addition, the Colony Court evaluated the
legislative history of the statute in question and found the congressional
purpose of the extended statute was to give the IRS more time to assess
situations in which the IRS is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors
because the particular transaction was not reported.129
While the law had been relatively clear on that point in the intervening
seventy years since Colony, on September 24, 2009, the government issued
temporary regulations that provided that “an understated amount of gross
income resulting from an overstatement of unrecovered cost or other basis
constitutes an omission from gross income for purposes of [sections
6229(c)(2) and 6501(e)(1)(A)].”130 In issuing that temporary regulation, the
IRS sought, by administrative fiat, to create a new interpretation of the
overstatement of the basis rule.131 On December 14, 2010, the IRS issued
128. Colony, 357 U.S. at 32. The Court noted that “[a]lthough we are inclined to think that
the statute on its face lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer’s interpretation [that omit
means left out, not understated], it cannot be said that the language is unambiguous.” Id. at 33.
129. See id. at 36 (“Congress manifested no broader purpose than to give the Commissioner
an additional two years to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer’s
omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special disadvantage in detecting
errors.”).
130. Alan Horowitz, Son-of-BOSS Statute of Limitation Issue Inundates the Courts of
Appeals, TAX APPELLATE BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010), http://appellatetax.com/2010/11/30/son-ofboss-statute-of-limitations-issue-inundates-the-courts-of-appeals (citing Temp. Treas. Reg. §§
301.6229(c)(2)-1T, 301.6501(e)-1T).
131. The IRS argued that its regulatory interpretation should be afforded Chevron deference
by the courts. See id. Horowitz notes:
The Tax Court was the first tribunal to consider the efficacy of this
aggressive (one might say, desperate) effort to use the regulatory process to
trump settled precedent, as the IRS moved the Tax Court to reconsider its
adverse decision in Intermountain Ins. Service v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2009-195, in the wake of the temporary regulations. The reception was
underwhelming.The Tax Court denied the motion for reconsideration by a
13–0 vote, generating three different opinions. The majority opinion, joined
by seven judges, was the only one to base its ruling on rejecting the
substance of the government’s argument that courts should defer to the
regulations notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s Colony decision. (Four
judges stated simply that the new contention about the temporary regulations
should not be entertained on a motion for reconsideration; two judges stated
that the temporary regulations are procedurally invalid for failure to submit
them for notice and comment.)
Id. The government’s deference argument rested on National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005), which ruled that a “court’s prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” (In a
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final regulations stating that an understatement of gross income due to an
overstatement of basis constitutes an omission of gross income that can
trigger the extended six-year period of limitations for assessing tax
liability.132
While “a man’s reach should exceed his grasp,” such should not be the
case for federal agencies.133 The government’s new rule, in essence, allowed
it to ignore Colony and use the six-year statute of limitations against
taxpayers who participated in Son of Boss shelters. In litigation, the
government took aggressive positions related to the statute of limitations
issue, and, at one point, the Justice Department asserted that there were
thirty-five to fifty cases pending in the federal courts that raised the same
issue, with approximately $1 billion at stake.134 Although the government
lost the overwhelming majority of the Son of Boss shelter cases seeking to
use the six-year statute of limitations at trial, it won a few, causing the split
in the circuits that led to the Supreme Court accepting the case for review. 135
In Home Concrete, the Supreme Court ultimately found for the taxpayer,
rejecting the IRS’ attempt to rewrite the statute of limitations. Thus, the $1
billion of improper tax benefits at stake was forever lost, at least for the
government.
C.

Contingent Deferred Swap

Around the time the Son of Boss shelter was creating paper losses to
shelter capital gains, another technical tax shelter employing derivatives, the
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated his view that this rule would not apply to a Supreme
Court decision, because that would automatically render the statute unambiguous, but that
remains an open question. See id.at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring)). The Tax Court majority
ruled that the Supreme Court’s statement in Colony that the statute was ambiguous “was only a
preliminary conclusion,” but “[a]fter thoroughly reviewing the legislative history, the Supreme
Court concluded that Congress’ intent was clear and that the statutory provision was
unambiguous.” Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Revnue, 134 T.C.
211, 223 (2010) (citing Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 33, 36 (1958)).
Accordingly, the majority concluded that Brand X did not apply, and “the temporary regulations
are either inapplicable, invalid or otherwise not entitled to deference.” Id. at 215. (The two
judges who found the regulations procedurally invalid questioned the majority’s reasoning and
suggested that the Court should not have reached the substantive issue). See id. at 227 (Halpern,
J., concurring).
132. T.D. 9511, 2011-6 I.R.B. 455.
133. ROBERT BROWNING,MEN AND WOMEN (Forgotten Books 2012) (1855). The full quote
is, “Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, Or what’s a heaven for?”
134. See Horowitz, supra note 130.
135. See Steve R. Johnson, What’s Next in the Section 6501(e) Overstated Basis
Controversy?, ABA SECTION OF TAX’N NEWS QUARTERLY 19 (Fall 2009) (summarizing the
cases).
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Contingent Deferred Swap (“CDS”) shelter, was creating phantom
deductions to shelter ordinary income.136 The CDS shelter used the tax law
against itself by combining offsetting positions to allow taxpayers to defer
recognizing an unlimited amount of ordinary income.137 CDS, like Son of
Boss, had a dial up feature that allowed the taxpayer to size the transaction
to meet a desired amount of tax benefit, with little to no extra risk in the
transaction based on the transaction’s size.138 Some CDS clients, unsatisfied
with deferral and character benefits of CDS, added another wrinkle, called
CDS Add-on, to try to defer indefinitely the tax savings gains generated in
the CDS transaction.139
The CDS shelter exploited, inter alia, the lack of guidance provided by
the IRS with respect to total return swaps and the different treatment of

136. The ordinary deductions were created through the use of a so-called trading
partnership. That aspect of CDS is mentioned here for completeness, but is not the focus of this
Article. The United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations noted:
The tax shelter involved a transfer to a partnership that generates a level of
trading activity designed to enable the partnership to achieve trading
partnership status that, in turn, allegedly allows swap payments and other
first year expenses of the partnership to be treated as ordinary losses that can
offset the client’s ordinary income in that year.
U.S. SEN. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE U.S. TAX
SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 79 (2005).
137. CDS was marketed to taxpayers seeking to create a certain amount of loss, usually
equal to the amount of ordinary income the taxpayer sought to shelter. In fact, Ernst & Young,
in documents that turned over to the Senate Subcommittee, had a sample CDS engagement
letter that stated explicitly: “Our fee for providing the professional services referred to above
will be $[Insert amount at 1.25% of losses to be generated. If size of transaction is not certain at
the time this letter is signed, add ‘based on your investing $million in the Partnership’].”
(emphasis in original). See id. at 85.
138. See id.at 84 (“Essentially, CDS was a conversion strategy, converting ordinary income
to capital gains income, with the additional benefit of deferral.”).
139. See Indictment, United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2012), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/us_v.%20Coplan%20E&Y%20Ta
x%20Shelter%20Indictment%20May%2030%202007.pdf.
The objective of CDS Add-On was for the client to defer indefinitely the
income tax liability on the capital gains generated in the second year of the
CDS transaction. In most cases, CDS Add-On consisted of two parts: 1) a
two-year CDS transaction that would result in capital gains to the CDS
“trading partnership”; and 2) a COBRA-like strategy that would generate
artificial losses for the “trading partnership,” and thus offset those capital
gains.
Id. The “COBRA-like strategy” referred to another tax shelter, the Currency Options Bring
Reward Alternatives (“COBRA”). For a thorough analysis of COBRA, see Karen C. Burke &
Grayson M. P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, THE TAX LAWYER,
Aug. 7, 2008, at 62, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148371.
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fixed versus contingent returns.140 Simply stated, returns from fixed income
investments generally require taxpayers to accrue interest income, meaning
the taxpayer is treated, for tax purposes, as if he had earned interest during
each taxable year the investment was ongoing, whether he received that
interest or not.141 For example, if a taxpayer purchased a five-year zero
coupon bond, the taxpayer would have to recognize the interest earned on
that bond each year, even though the investor would not receive any
payments for five years. Contrast that with returns from a contingent
investment, like equity. For tax purposes, the taxes on a contingent return
are taxed using open treatment, meaning the taxpayer will not recognize
gain or loss until the asset is sold or otherwise disposed of.142
In a simplified example of a CDS shelter, a taxpayer would enter into an
eighteen-month total return swap (“CDS swap”) with a financial institution
with the reference asset being the equity of a special purpose entity (“SPE”)
created solely for the transaction and the notional amount of the CDS swap
equal to the value of the SPE’s equity.143 As part of the CDS swap, the
taxpayer would make quarterly interest-type periodic payments, usually
based on a fixed or floating interest rate (usually some form of LIBOR 144)
and would receive at termination the SPE’s equity return. The taxpayer’s
140. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, We’re Not in Kansas Anymore: The IRS Struggles with
Contingent Swap, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 2, 2002, at 150–54 [hereinafter Sheppard, Kansas].
I.R.S. Notice 2006-16 provides that if the taxpayer takes the contingent nonperiodic payment
into account over the life of the contract under a reasonable amortization method and properly
accounts for the NPC, such a transaction would not be deemed substantially similar to mistyped to which auto-corrects to taxpayer the transaction described in Notice 2002-35. See, e.g.,
Crystal Tandon, IRS Attempts to Limit Scope of Contingent Swaps Notice, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 14, 2006, at 30–33. See also Geoffrey Lanning, Notice 2006-16: IRS Clarifies Prior
Guidance on Notional Principal Contracts with Contingent Nonperiodic Payments,
DERIVATIVES—FIN.
PRODS.
REPORT,
May
2006,
at
1,
available
athttp://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/b416d841-a20e-41c8-97c31476b00883b1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/204275cb-845b-4a5c-9a7e15f7f4fd2f16/article_Lanning_Financial%20Products%20Report.pdf.
141. See I.R.C. § 163 (2012).
142. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
143. The CDS shelter often used partnerships, and had an ongoing trading element,
purportedly to enable the client to be able to actually use the deductions at issue. This example
ignores the elements of the transaction not dealing with the derivatives. For a thorough analysis
of the CDS Shelter, see the Appeals Settlement Guidelines for Notional Principal Contracts
(Contingent Deferred Swaps), IRS (Feb. 8, 2006), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/asg_npc__2005-0420_redacted.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Guidelines].
144. “LIBOR” refers to the London Interbank Offer Rate. The LIBOR rate is an interest
rate at which banks can borrow funds, in marketable size, from other banks in the London
interbank market. The LIBOR is derived from a filtered average of the world’s most
creditworthy banks’ interbank deposit rates for larger loans with maturities between
overnight and one full year. See, e.g., London Interbank Offered Rate, INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/terms/l/libor.asp#ixzz28XrqJDg9 (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
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periodic payment obligation was calculated with reference to the notional
amount multiplied by the periodic payment rate (with appropriate
adjustments for payment frequency). The taxpayer’s return was any positive
returns on the equity value of the SPE, and its losses would be any negative
returns on the SPE, meaning the taxpayer would have to pay additional
funds to the counterparty if the SPE lost money.
The tax trick in the transaction was the composition of the SPE. In CDS,
the SPE was filled with mostly fixed income assets—assets whose returns
would offset the overwhelming majority of the taxpayer’s periodic payment
obligations.145 However, because the SPE had some equity assets, the
taxpayer took the position that its entire SPE return was an equity return,
meaning that any gain (or loss) should be deferred until the CDS swap’s
termination.146 The CDS shelter’s primary tax benefit was that the taxpayer
would claim large current deductions for the CDS swap periodic payments
that would be used to offset the taxpayer’s ordinary income. Yet those
deductions were effectively paid for by the return on the SPE’s assets.
Another tax benefit was that the income received at termination would be
treated as a capital gain, which was taxed at a lower rate.
In essence, the CDS shelter used the tax accounting of swaps, the lack of
IRS guidance, and the time value of money to pick a desired deduction with
little economic reality and then generate timing (current deductions, deferral
of income) and character (ordinary deductions and capital gain income) tax
benefits without any significant risk. The following example illustrates how
taxpayers used CDS to shelter ordinary income:
On January 1, Taxpayer enters into an eighteen-month CDS swap with a
bank with a $3 billion notional amount.147 Pursuant to the CDS swap,
taxpayer agrees to make annual periodic payments of 5% of the notional
amount (i.e., $150 million annually).148 In return, the taxpayer will receive
145. Often, the financial institution itself would use its own fixed income assets to fund the
special purpose entity, making the funding of the special purpose entity nothing more than a
bookkeeping entry for the financial institution.
146. See Warren, supra note 30, at 900 (noting that “income taxation has traditionally relied
on a distinction between fixed and contingent returns to determine when income is taxed, (b)
financial theory demonstrates that this distinction may not be tenable in practice, and (c) the
U.S. income tax relies on other distinctions that may also be undermined by innovative financial
contracts”).
147. The swaps were structured with a nominal end date, but, often with a wink and a nod,
taxpayers understood that if they terminated the swap early, they would be entitled to claim
capital gains treatment. See, e.g., Press Release, Justice Department, Promoter of Ernest &
Young
Tax
Shelters
Pleads
Guilty
(Jan.
22,
2009),
available
at
www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January09/boltoncharlespleapr.pdf.
148. An obvious question is, where does the taxpayer get the $150 million to pay the
counterparty? The answer in many transactions was the counterparty financial institution loaned
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the return on an SPE whose only assets consists of (1) $2.99 billion of fixed
income assets (assets generating a return of 5% annually), and (2) $10
million of stock. From a purely economic perspective, the taxpayer has
entered into two swaps:
(1) a $2.99 billion swap where the payment obligations are offset
by the economic returns of the reference assets, here the $2.99
billion of fixed income assets; and
(2) a $10 million total return swap on the stock.

The taxpayer’s payment obligation on the swap, $150 million annually, is
almost fully offset by the 5% return on the $2.99 billion of fixed income
assets in the SPE, equal to $149.5 million. The only real risk the taxpayer
faces is based on whether the $10 million of stock generates a 5% return.
The CDS tax benefits do not follow the economics, however. For tax
purposes, the taxpayer claims that he entered into a $3 billion total return
swap on a contingent pool of assets because the return on SPE is
“contingent,” i.e., a part of the SPE’s return was equity. Thus, the taxpayer
claims a year-one deduction of $150 million periodic payments on the
swap; the offsetting $149.5 million (plus the stock return) in income is
recognized as capital gain income in year two. In addition, the transaction
allowed the taxpayer to size the transaction to reach a desired deduction
amount with no discernible additional risk.149
The mischief created by the CDS shelter was arguably encouraged by the
IRS and the Treasury. In 1993, the Treasury finalized regulations relating to

the taxpayer the $150 million, secured by the return of the SPE. Because the counterparty was
fully secured (and because the entire purpose of the transaction was tax deductions), everyone
was happy. See, e.g., Settlement Guidelines, supra note 143, noting:
The [CDS participant] typically borrows funds from [the financial
institution] for a period of eighteen months pursuant to a Loan Agreement.
The Loan Agreement provides for an early payment date that coincides with
the early termination date . . . the loan is guaranteed to always be fully
collateralized since the amount on deposit with [financial institution] will
never be less than the loan amount at the termination of the transaction. [The
financial institution’s] own credit documents indicate that the loan is never at
risk for this very reason.
Id.
149. In the above example, the notional amount was set at $3 billion and the periodic
payments were 5% of the notional amount, generating a $150 million annual deduction. But
since that $150 million payment was effectively offset by the earnings on the fixed income
assets in the SPE, the taxpayer had no real risk in the transaction other than the real $10 million
total return swap on the equity portion buried inside CDS. Thus, taxpayers were free to adjust
the size of the notional amount to achieve a certain amount of deductions, with no real
substance or risk.
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the timing of NPC income and deductions.150 While those regulations
provided relatively clear guidance with respect to NPCs with noncontingent returns (such as returns on fixed income assets), no guidance
was provided for assets upon which the returns were contingent (such as
equities). In the absence of Treasury or IRS guidance, most taxpayers
accounted for contingent swap payments on a wait-and-see basis, pursuant
to which a taxpayer would ignore the contingent payment until it was
received (or the contingency was resolved).151 The wait-and-see approach
purportedly created a timing mismatch between deductions and income
because the periodic payments the taxpayer made were currently deductible,
while the contingent payment at the end of the NPC was deferred. The
“wait-and-see” approach, which appeared to be the proper treatment absent
Treasury or IRS guidance, encouraged transactions like the CDS shelter
because the IRS appeared to have acquiesced on the treatment by failing to
issue guidance.152
After eight years without guidance, the IRS and Treasury issued Notice
2001-44 to seek to clarify the treatment of contingent swap payments.153 In
Notice 2001-44, four potential accounting methods were outlined, which
had the effect of creating more confusion in an already muddled area of
law.154 Three years later, in 2004, the Treasury issued proposed regulations
to provide some guidance.155 During the interim, tax shelter promoters
150. See I.R.C. § 475 (2012).
151. The 1993 NPC regulations contains the following language: “The final regulations do
not include any examples of how to treat nonperiodic payments that are not fixed in amount at
the inception of the contract. The IRS expects to address contingent payments in future
regulations . . . .” T.D. 8491, 1993-2 C.B. 215.
152. The CDS shelter also sought to take advantage of a number of other tax law provisions
not discussed herein. However, the focus of this Article is on the derivatives involved in the
transaction.
153. I.R.S. Notice 2001-44, 2001-2 C.B. 77. According to the Notice:
The lack of comprehensive guidance in this area of the law has created
significant uncertainty for taxpayers. For some, this uncertainty adds a
considerable burden to the tax compliance process, and may discourage
certain taxpayers from entering into NPCs. Other taxpayers welcome the
ability to pick and choose among various tax law theories as to the character
and timing of NPC payments, but this can lead to a whipsaw of the
government. Both result in lack of confidence in the tax system, and
inefficiencies in the capital markets.
Id.
154. See id. The four methods were (1) The Noncontingent Swap Method; (2) the Full
Allocation Method; (3) the Modified Full Allocation Method; and (4) the Mark-to-Market
Method. A detailed analysis of the four methods is beyond the scope of this Article. Id.
155. See Prop.Treas. Reg. § 1.446-30, 69 Fed.Reg. 8886 (Feb. 26, 2004). The proposed
regulations mandated the Noncontingent Swap Method to account for income and deductions of
contingent non-periodic swap payments. Pursuant to the Noncontingent Swap Method, in
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stepped into the breach and created the CDS shelter. Given the lack of
guidance, the shelter flourished. In 2002, in an attempt to stem the tide, the
government issued two not-so-complementary pronouncements, adding
confusion to an already confusing area of the law.156
The two pronouncements were Revenue Ruling 2002-30 and Notice
2002-35. In Revenue Ruling 2002-30, the IRS required accrual of the
noncontingent portion of a contingent swap payment. This approach is
commonly termed bifurcation, where a pool of assets is split into a
contingent portion (usually equity) and a noncontingent portion (usually
fixed income assets).157 However, the revenue ruling conflicted with
existing swap regulations that did not permit bifurcation.158 In Notice 200235, issued after Revenue Ruling 2002-30, the IRS stated that the transaction
at issue in the Notice (the CDS shelter) should be recharacterized and
treated according to its economic substance.159 While treating the CDS
shelter according to its economic substance may have been correct, such
treatment was not, strictly speaking, bifurcation.
In 2006, the IRS began “quietly offering to settle” CDS shelters.160 Under
the settlement offer, the IRS required settling taxpayers to accrue as
ordinary income 85% of the noncontingent, nonperiodic payments and

general terms, taxpayers are required to accrue the contingent leg of an NPC under a method
described in the 2004 proposed regulations.
156. See David P. Hariton, Confusion About Swaps and Rev. Rul. 2002-30, 95 TAX NOTES
1211 (2002); Sheppard, Kansas, supra note 140; Sheryl Stratton, Contingent Payment Ruling
Creates More Questions, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 24, 2002, at 142–44.
157. See Sheppard, Kansas, supra note 140.
158. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3 (2013). For example, Treasury Regulation § 1.4463(f)(2) prescribes several methods for accrual of a nonperiodic payment under a swap that do
not require creation of a deemed loan and the attendant creation of interest expense, and
Treasury Regulation § 1.446-3(g)(4) prescribes a method for accrual of a significant
nonperiodic payment under a swap. Under this latter method, the swap is to be treated as two
separate transactions consisting of an on-market, level payment swap and a loan. According to
one commentator, Revenue Ruling 2002-30 sought to treat a swap under both methods at once.
See Sheppard, Kansas, supra note 140.
159. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(g)(2) (providing that if a taxpayer, either directly or through
a related person, reduces risk with respect to an NPC by purchasing, selling, or otherwise
entering into other NPCs, futures, forwards, options, or other financial contracts (other than debt
instruments), the taxpayer may not use the alternative methods provided in paragraphs (f)(2)(iii)
and (v) of § 1.446-3; moreover, where such positions are entered into to avoid the appropriate
timing or character of income from the contracts taken together, the Commissioner may require
that amounts paid to or received by the taxpayer under the notional principal contract be treated
in a manner that is consistent with the economic substance of the transaction as a whole). See
also Settlement Guidelines, supra note 143.
160. See Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Settling Contingent Deferred Swap Shelters,TAX NOTES
TODAY, Feb. 28, 2006, at 39–41.
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allowed the remaining 15% to be treated as capital gain. 161 The IRS also
allowed taxpayers to deduct their transaction costs.162
IV.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO SHELTERS

Despite many recent high profile victories, the government tax shelter
strategy thus far has been akin to Whac-A-Mole, wherein the government
pounds on a particular shelter only to discover new (and often improved)
shelters popping up.163 Historically, once the government identified a new
shelter, the government marshaled its forces to stamp out that particular
shelter and any similar shelters.164 Nevertheless, the government has only
had limited success in deterring taxpayers from engaging in shelters.
One issue for the government is their lack of resources to fight shelters.
Unlike most situations where the government has superior resources, in the
tax shelter arena, the government is “[o]ften understaffed and outwitted,
[and, as a result,] IRS agents have resorted to using every penalty, sanction,
procedural tactic, threat, and common law doctrine available in their arsenal
to capture the” lost income from tax shelters.165 Moreover, because
“detection and penalty rates cannot realistically exist at levels that will
meaningfully deter wrongdoing,”166 sophisticated tax planners “press on,
tweaking the deal just enough to sidestep reform.”167
161. Seeid.; see alsoForm Letter is Available on IRS Settlement Offer for Swaps, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28, 2006, at 39–42.
162. See Sheppard, supra note 160.
163. See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Prevails in Three
Tax
Shelter
Cases
on
Same
Day(Oct.
4,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv111314.htm. “Whac-A-Mole” is an arcade game which typically
consists of a large, waist-level cabinet with five holes in its top and a large, soft, black mallet.
Each hole contains a single plastic mole and the machinery necessary to move it up and down.
Once the game starts, the moles will begin to pop up from their holes at random. The object of
the game is to force the individual moles back into their holes by hitting them directly on the
head with the mallet, thereby adding to the player’s score. The more quickly this is done the
higher the final score will be. See, e.g., Sara D. Sunderland, Domain Name Speculation: Are We
Playing Whac-A-Mole, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 465, 465 n.2 (2010); Whac-A-Mole, BOB’S
SPACE RACERS, http://www.bobsspaceracers.com/whac-a-mole/html-index.htm (last visited Feb.
13, 2013); Whac-A-Mole, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whac-A-Mole (last visited
Feb. 13, 2013). For example, the government’s response to the BOSS led to the development of
an arguably better transaction, i.e., Son of Boss.
164. See, e.g., Schizer, Frictions, supra note 83.
165. See Rachelle Y. Holmes, Forcing Cooperation: A Strategy for Improving Tax
Compliance, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1417–18 (2011) (citing David. M. Schizer, Enlisting the
Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 335–36 (2006)).
166. Id. at 1419.
167. Schizer, Frictions, supra note 83.
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Abusive shelters for large corporations and high-income individuals have
cost the U.S. Treasury many billions annually, according to Treasury
Department estimates.168 The weapons in the government’s arsenal to fight
tax shelters consist of audits, litigation, settlements, and changes in the law.
Those weapons have held the line against an explosion of pre-1986 tax
shelters but have done little to diminish the marginal growth of the shelter
industry or to create disincentives for wealthy taxpayers seeking to game
the system. While it is easy to criticize the government’s approach, it is
equally important to understand that the government is overmatched, as
trying to control the spread of tax shelters is like trying to herd cats.
A.

Audits, Litigation, and Settlements

Taxpayers, for the most part, are rational and will only undertake an
action if the potential benefits outweigh the costs.169 Using the tax shelters
described above, the potential benefits to the taxpayer of the transactions are
obvious—the millions of dollars saved in taxes. What are not so obvious are
the potential costs to the taxpayers, and having an understanding of those
potential costs sheds light on why technical tax shelters have proliferated.
As with all things economic, a few assumptions are necessary before
trying to explain any economically-driven behavior. The first assumption is
that taxpayers are rational economic actors, and they will not participate in
tax shelters if they believe the costs of participation outweigh the benefits.
The second assumption is that we can quantify the costs and benefits.
Using a simple expected value calculation of a tax shelter, from a
taxpayer’s perspective, the taxpayer will enter the transaction if the
potential benefits equal to the probability of receiving the benefits
multiplied by the benefits’ value, exceed the potential costs, equal to the
probability of paying such costs multiplied by the total costs. 170 For this
168. See TAX DIVISION: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 8,
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-tax-justification.pdf.
169. See, e.g., Logue, supra note 6, at 231 (discussing whether the application of the
rational expectations assumption to tax law); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using
Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691–92 (2009)
(discussing the conditions that will deter individuals with varying levels of rationality).
170. This “simple” expected value calculation is derived from the groundbreaking works of
Jeremy Bentham and Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker. See, e.g., Gary Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,76J. POL. ECON.169 (1968). See William A.
Drennan, Strict Liability And Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2009). Professor
Drennan’s article describes a rational taxpayer as “homo economicus” (borrowing from other
literature) and notes that “[e]conomics alone motivates homo economicus. He engages in
socially harmful behavior unless his total expected cost from behaving badly, including
penalties, equals or exceeds his total expected cost of behaving lawfully.” Id. See also Richard

44

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

analysis, the potential benefits are the net tax savings the transaction
promises. For example, assume a particular tax shelter purported to generate
$100 million of tax loss at a transaction cost of $7 million.171 The $100
million of tax loss (assuming it can be utilized by the taxpayer—a valid
assumption, because there would be no other reason to enter the transaction
in the first place) would generate a tax benefit of $35 million. The
transaction would thus yield a net benefit (assuming the taxpayer can deduct
the fees paid to the promoter) of $30.45 million ($35 million from the
transaction, with net fees equal to $4.55 million).172 The potential costs
would include the costs associated with: (i) defending the transaction if the
transaction is challenged by the government; (ii) losing the tax benefits; and
(iii) any penalties the taxpayer incurs based on the transaction.173
Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax
Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 53 (2001) (“[P]romoters often indicate, either explicitly or
implicitly, that clients should factor the likelihood of discovery into their appraisal of the
transaction; promoters advocate playing the audit lottery.”). Other scholars have used more
econometric tools to evaluate penalty structures. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of
Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255 (2002) (arguing that the government’s
current strategy for deterring corporate tax shelters can be effective). Gergen states:
A rational firm evaluating an illicit over-aggressive tax strategy that
considered only the immediate financial implications would weigh the tax
savings, t, the cost of executing the strategy, ce, the probability that the
position will be detected by the government, Pd, the probability of an adverse
decision upon detection, Pa, and the penalty it would pay on an adverse
decision, s, which I treat as a factor of the tax savings. Equation (1) shows
the relation among these financial variables. It expresses the expected
financial return on execution of the strategy: t(1 - sPdPa) - ce(1).
Id. at 261.
171. The fees charged by promoters for many tax shelters are based on a percentage of the
taxpayer’s expected tax savings in the transaction. This analysis prices the fee at 20% of the tax
benefit, which is not out of line with fees for Son of Boss and CDS shelters. See, e.g., Alpha I,
L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 280, 297 (2010) (noting that the charge was 25% of what the
taxpayer would have paid); see also Ben Wang, Supplying The Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent
Fee Compensation for Accountants Spurs Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1257–76 (2003)
(citing Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14,
1998, at 198) (“For example, Pricewaterhouse Coopers will charge anywhere from 8–30%
depending on the product and its originality.”).
172. Calculated as the tax benefit of the loss for a taxpayer in a 35% tax bracket ($35
million, equal to 35% x $100 million) minus the net cost of the fees ($4.55 million, equal to the
after tax cost of the $7 million fee, ($7 million minus ($7 million x 35%))). The numbers used
in this example are derived from the numbers used in a similar analysis. See Lavoie, supra note
169, at 52–55.
173. This analysis assumes the only costs are economic costs from participating in the
shelter. It ignores social, ethical, or behavioral sanctions that could arise, and also ignores
potential criminal liability. I have excluded the potential interest costs the government charges
on underpayments of tax (and penalties) because, as discussed infra, such costs may not serve as
a deterrent.
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Before quantifying those costs, the taxpayer would need to assess the
likelihood of getting caught, i.e., the chances of the IRS challenging the
transaction on audit. In 2011, for individual taxpayers earning over $1
million, the chance of being audited was approximately 13.4%.174 In
addition to individual audits, the IRS also audits flow-through entities taxed
as partnerships, and individuals often enter shelters through such entities.175
The likelihood of audit of flow through entities in 2011 was 0.4%.176 For the
purpose of this analysis of expected value, let us conservatively assume the
likelihood of being audited, either individually or through a flow through
entity, is 15%.
So, for an individual taxpayer, if the risk of detection is 15%, the
taxpayer would have an 85% chance of receiving the $30.45 million tax
benefit and a 15% chance of paying some cost. The cost to dissuade a
rational taxpayer from undertaking that risk would thus have to exceed
approximately $172.6 million, calculated by solving for the expected cost,
equating the probability of the expected benefit (85% x $30.45 million)
with the probability of the expected cost (15% x $172.6 million).177
Scenario
Outcome
No Audit
$30.45 million
Audit
$172 million
Expected Benefit/(Cost)

Probability
85%
15%

Exp. Return/(Loss)
$25.9 million
($25.9 million)
$0

However, the potential costs could not conceivably reach $172.6 million.
The three components of that cost (defending the transaction, losing the tax
benefits, and penalties) fit within a relatively narrow band: the tax benefits
174. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2011 DATA BOOK, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf. The data is approximate because the IRS does not
have an explicit over $1 million category. The audit rate for individuals with adjusted gross
incomes between $1 million and $5 million was 11.80%, representing .15% of all returns; the
audit rate for individuals with adjusted gross incomes between $5 million and $10 million was
20.75%, representing .01% of all returns, and the audit rate for individuals with adjusted gross
incomes over $10 million was 29.93%, representing .01% of all returns. Using a weighted
average of the three groups provides a rough estimate of 13.4%.
175. Entities taxed as partnerships were integral to allowing the taxpayers to utilize the tax
benefits in both the Son of Boss and CDS tax shelters.
176. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173.
177. The calculation uses the expected benefit to determine the expected cost. The expected
benefit of the transaction is equal to $25.9 million, the probability of receiving the benefit (85%)
multiplied by the total benefit ($30.45 million). Equating the expected benefit to the expected
cost, because the likelihood of detection is 15%, the total cost of detection would have to equal
$172.9 million to make the expected cost $25.9 million.
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of the transaction are $37.45 million ($35 million for the transaction plus
$2.45 million benefit based on the deduction for the fees), and the largest
potential penalty, for participants who fail to disclose their participation in a
Reportable Transaction, amounts to only 75% of the claimed tax benefits of
a transaction.178 Again, using $37.45 million as the tax benefit, the highest
penalty, at 75%, would be about $28.1 million. So, for our rational
taxpayer, the maximum cost of the lost tax benefit and the penalty is $65.5
million.179 The only remaining cost is the cost of challenging the IRS, and it
is difficult to conceive a taxpayer that is willing to spend over $107.1
million on litigation to bring that potential cost to $172.6 million.180 If the
taxpayer’s strategy was to concede as soon as he were audited, thereby
avoiding any litigation costs, the taxpayer’s expected value calculation
would look as follows:
Scenario
No Audit
Audit – Concede All
Issues – No Litigation
Expected Benefit/(Cost)

Outcome
$30.45
million
$65.5
million

Probability
85%

Exp. Return/(Loss)
$25.9 million

15%

($9.8 million)
$16.1 million

The above expected value analysis shows why rational taxpayers (with tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars to potentially shelter) play the tax shelter
game. It fails, however, to provide the entire picture because taxpayers can
further reduce their potential costs by playing the game better than the
government.

178. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 imposed new penalties on taxpayers who fail
to adequately disclose “reportable transactions” to the IRS. American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, sec. 816, 118 Stat. 1418, 1583 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Jobs Act].
Before the 2004 Jobs Act, taxpayers were generally only penalized for not disclosing a
reportable transaction if the IRS was successful in challenging the transaction. Accordingly,
many taxpayers were not overly concerned about disclosing these transactions, especially if the
tax benefits of the transaction were clearly legitimate and/or there was little chance of a
successful IRS challenge.
179. See I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006). The IRS has the burden of proving fraud by clear and
convincing evidence for this penalty to apply; see id., § 6663(b), 7454(a), TAX CT. R. 142(b).
180. While the costs associated with defending a transaction can be substantial, taxpayers
are often able to mitigate those costs. For example, taxpayers who participated in Son of Boss
shelters often participated in those shelters through partnerships. When the IRS challenged the
shelters, many promoters, protecting their own economic interest (i.e., the threat of a lawsuit by
suddenly outraged taxpayers), chose to underwrite the defense of the transactions in question.
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Many of the individual taxpayers who fought the tax shelters described
herein had what one writer artfully described as “boxcar deficiencies.”181
They were also very wealthy and could afford to hire the best legal talent to
advise them of their rights once the IRS audit letter arrived. Once that
happened, those taxpayers had a myriad of ways to reduce their potential
costs: such as responding to often generous IRS settlement initiatives (as
described above); using strategic concessions to avoid the imposition of
penalties (and minimize the cost of litigation);182 winning procedural
victories against the IRS (such as Home Concrete); and suing the promoters
for something akin to malpractice.
A logical inquiry at this point would be why the IRS provides taxpayers
the opportunity to settle, especially if the terms of those settlements (as
were the case in both the CDS and Son of Boss settlements) allow any
benefit for transactions that would likely lose on the merits. The IRS,
however, also has to do a cost-benefit analysis, but with far different
criteria.183 As a primary matter, the IRS must weigh carefully the costs of
181. See Sheppard, 11 Rules, supra note 121, at 180. “Boxcar deficiencies” are tax
deficiencies so large that the cash to pay the deficiency would have to be transported by rail.
182. Taxpayers have used certain concessions to avoid penalties. In the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, taxpayers have successfully argued that when the IRS attacks a transaction on multiple
grounds, if the taxpayer concedes on a ground that does not provide penalties, the IRS cannot
apply certain penalties to the taxpayer. See Keller v. Comm’r., 556 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2009)
(IRS unable to assess valuation overstatement penalty after taxpayer conceded to invalid
deductions and that a negligene penalty applied); Heasley v. Comm’r., 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1990) (IRS unable to assess valuation overstatement penalty when taxpayers conceded to taking
tax credits for overvalued investments and did not dispute the tax deficiency); Todd v. Comm’r.,
862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988) (IRS unable to assess valuation overstatement penalty after
taxpayers conceded items were not placed in service during tax years for which claimed
deductions and credits were taken); see also Jeremiah Coder, Self-Serving Concessions and
Penalty Avoidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 26, 2012, at 1583–84. The IRS has stated that it
disagrees with the decision in Keller. Nonacq., 2011-44 I.R.B. 603, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb11-44.pdf.
183. Richard Lavoie explains:
Even if the Service spots and challenges the transaction, the taxpayer may
wind up no worse off for having attempted such an aggressive transaction.
After weighing the risk of loss in litigation together with the great expense of
litigating a complex tax-shelter transaction, the Service may be willing to
settle the matter with the taxpayer by allowing a portion of the tax benefit
sufficient to defray the taxpayer’s original transaction costs. . . . The
settlement would be rational for the Service based on a 10% risk of loss at
trial and an expected $2 million in litigation expenses. For the corporate
taxpayer, the settlement would largely defray the original payment of the
promoter’s fee and leave the taxpayer in essentially the same tax position as
if the transaction never had occurred. If the promoter agreed to defend the
case for free, this agreement would reduce further the potential downside
cost for the corporate taxpayer.
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losing, a cost far higher than the tax loss in an individual transaction. When
the IRS loses a tax shelter case, the record of that loss becomes a “How To”
manual for tax shelter promoters, which will multiply the potential tax loss
from a particular transaction. Also in determining whether to litigate, the
IRS must be convinced it can demonstrate to a court why the transaction
should not be respected. As mentioned above, most of these technical tax
shelters rely on the Code and Treasury Regulations for their purported tax
benefits, so for those shelters, the IRS must show why the taxpayers’
reliance on the law was misplaced. But so demonstrating often gives the
IRS a difficult choice: state that the technical analysis of the transaction is
correct but that some common law principle, such as economic substance,
substance over form, step transaction, sham transaction, etc., requires that
the transaction not be respected, or show how the technical analysis is
incorrect and thus provide some measure of finality to an open tax question.
The risk in providing that finality is that it often opens the door to other tax
shelters using that same analysis.
Another hurdle the IRS must potentially face is the taxpayer’s reasonable
cause defense, which mitigates the imposition of penalties. In most
circumstances, the Code disallows penalties if it is shown that the taxpayer
had reasonable cause for the position taken and that the taxpayer acted in
good faith.184 Taxpayers, especially taxpayers involved in multi-million
dollar tax shelters, often claim that they relied on the advice of counsel,
giving them a prima facie argument for reasonable cause, and thus
substantially reducing the likelihood of penalties.
B.

Codification

The government has taken a significant step toward changing the
expected value calculation by codifying the economic substance doctrine. In
2010, Congress codified the long-standing economic substance doctrine
through section 1409 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010 (“2010 Act”).185 One goal of the 2010 Act was to stop technical tax
Lavoie, supra note 169, at 54 (internal citations omitted).
184. I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2006).
185. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 1029. The 2010 Act added new § 7701(o) to the Internal Revenue Code. The relevant
portions of I.R.C. § 7701(o) state:
(1) Application of doctrine. In the case of any transaction to which the
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as
having economic substance only if—
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal
income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (B) the taxpayer
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shelters, as evidenced by the Technical Explanation’s language that “several
doctrines [including the economic substance doctrine] . . . can be applied to
deny the tax benefits of a tax-motivated transaction, notwithstanding that
the transaction may satisfy the literal requirements of a specific tax
provision.”186
The 2010 Act added I.R.C. § 7701(o), which provides that for a
transaction to have economic substance for income tax purposes, the
transaction must (1) meaningfully change a taxpayer’s economic position
(apart from tax benefits) and (2) have a substantial nonfederal income tax
purpose (collectively, the “Codified Economic Substance Test”). 187 Prior to

has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering
into such transaction.
....
(5) Definitions and special rules. For purposes of this subsection—
(A) Economic substance doctrine. The term “economic substance
doctrine” means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under
subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction
does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose.
I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2006). The 2010 Act also added I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6), which provides that the
accuracy-related penalty imposed under § 6662(a) applies to any underpayment attributable to
“[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic
substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or failing to meet the requirements of any
similar rule of law” (collectively a § 6662(b)(6) transaction). I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2006). The
2010 Act also added I.R.C § 6662(i), which increases the accuracy-related penalty from 20% to
40% for any portion of an underpayment attributable to one or more I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6)
transactions “with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment are not
adequately disclosed in the return nor in a statement attached to the return.” I.R.C. § 6662(i)(2)
(2006).
186. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 142 (Comm. Print 2010)
[hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION].
187. See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2006). The term “economic substance” originated with Am. Sec.
& Trust Co. v. Tait, 5 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D. Md. 1933) (using the term “economic substance” in
determining whether a transaction should be respected). The concept of economic substance
predates that decision by fifteen years, however. See S. Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 337
(1918) (questioning whether a subsidiary’s income was its parent’s income or “in truth and in
substance” its own). Neither Congress, the Treasury, nor the IRS have provided any guidance
that would help taxpayers know what constitutes a “meaningful” change or what is a
“substantial” nonfederal income tax purpose for purposes of I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B).
On October 4, 2010, the IRS issued Notice 2010-62, which provides limited guidance relating
to the application of I.R.C. § 7701(o). Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411. The Notice
announced that the IRS will not issue any private letter rulings or determination letters on
whether economic substance is “relevant.” Id. at 412. Consequently, there will be no
government guidance on when economic substance is “relevant,” and taxpayers must make their
own determination under the peril of the strict liability penalties.
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codification, different courts used different standards to define economic
substance.188
Codification set forth a uniform standard for how economic substance
was defined. Codification provided a small shift in the law189 in that, prior to
codification, a conflict among circuit courts existed with respect to whether
the two parts of the economic substance test were disjunctive or
conjunctive.190
The greater change, at least to the tax bar, was Congress’ directives with
respect to the applicable penalties. The 2010 Act also adds new section
6662(b)(6), which applies a strict liability penalty for transactions “lacking
economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or failing to
meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.” No guidance was
provided on the meaning of the phrase “any similar rule of law.” 191 Thus, if

188. See Arthur Acevedo, Abusive Tax Practices: The 100-Year Onslaught on the Tax
Code, 17 BARRY L. REV. 179, 198–99 (2012).
189. In fact, I.R.C. § 7701(o) states that “The determination of whether the economic
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this
subsection had never been enacted.” I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (2006).
190. Acevedo, supra note 187, at 198–99. Acevedo stated:
[T]he circuits were split concerning how to evaluate and apply the economic
substance doctrine. The question was whether the test was to be applied in a
conjunctive manner or in a disjunctive manner. The Seventh Circuit, Eighth
Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit applied the test in a conjunctive manner. In
contrast, the Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit applied the
test in a disjunctive manner. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals took a
different approach altogether. The remaining circuits considered the two
prong test as elements in their analysis of the economic substance of the
transaction.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
191. Carol P. Tello, Dealing with Codified Economic Substance in the Context of
International Issues: Self Help, the Only Game in Town, TAX EXECUTIVES INST., June 7, 2011,
at
44,
available
at
http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Pages/TTE_SPRING11_dealing_with_codified_economic_sub
stance_in_the_context_of_international_issues.aspx (“There is no ‘official’ legislative history
for section 7701(o), i.e., no House Ways and Means Committee, Senate Finance Committee, or
Conference Committee Report except to the extent that the contemporaneous Technical
Explanation prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation would be so treated.
Although the Technical Explanation may not be considered formal ‘legislative history,’ it does
provide some insight and background on section 7701(o).”). Tello explains:
The Technical Explanation, however, explains that the penalty is intended to
apply to a transaction the tax benefits of which are disallowed as a result of
the application of factors and analysis similar to that required under the
provision for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is used
to describe the doctrine. Presumably, this phrase could include step
transaction, substance over form, business purpose, alter ego, and sham
doctrines (among others), but there is no limitation on what other rules of law
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a court determines that a transaction lacks economic substance, the taxpayer
faces a strict liability penalty of either 20%, if the transaction was properly
disclosed, or 40%, absent proper disclosure.192
While codification clarified the law and expanded the potential cost of
penalties, it did little to discourage taxpayer behavior. Most transactions so
devoid of substance that the economic substance doctrine is relevant are
doomed to fail no matter how the test is constructed. The clarification
provided by codification will have almost no effect on determining whether
a transaction should be respected. The rule is simply too narrow to capture
many technical tax shelters because all the economic substance test amounts
to is whether the transaction (or parts of the transaction) contain real risk.
The government could strengthen its attack on shelters by expanding the
reach of codification, using the authority Congress gave it to extend the
strict liability penalties to one or more of the “any similar rules of law,” as
set forth in I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6). However, the government thus far has been
reluctant to do so.
On October 4, 2010, the IRS issued Notice 2010-62 (Internal Revenue
Bulletin 2010-40) (“IRB Notice”). The IRB Notice provides “interim”
guidance regarding the codification of the economic substance doctrine
under I.R.C. § 7701(o). On September 14, 2010, the IRS issued a directive
requiring its examination division to seek substantial review before seeking
to impose the codified economic substance doctrine and its related
penalties.193 Later, on July 15, 2011, the IRS provided a directive (“ES
Directive”) to field examiners and their managers, telling them what
information must be developed and analyzed before seeking such a
review.194 Importantly, the ES Directive limited the application of the
codified economic substance doctrine, stating that it only applied to
application of the “economic substance doctrine” and not to other similar

Id.

may be invoked. The inclusion of this phrase in the penalty provision likely
enlarges the reach of section 7701(o).

192. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), 6662(i) (2006).
193. Directive from Heather C. Maloy, Comm’r, Large & Mid Size Bus. Div., IRS, to
Industry Directors on Codificaton of Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties
LMSB–20–0910–024
(Sept.
14,
2010),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Codification-of-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-RelatedPenalties.
194. Directive from Heather C. Maloy, Comm’r, Large Bus. & Int’l Div., IRS, to LB&I
Directive Industry Directors on Guidance for Examiners and Managerson the Codified
Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties LB&I–4–0711–015 (July 15, 2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-for-Examiners-and-Managers-on-theCodified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties [hereinafter ES Directive].
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rules of law or judicial doctrines, such as step transaction, substance over
form, or sham transaction. The IRS thus de-toothed the tiger.
In the ES Directive, the IRS stated that “until further guidance is issued,
the penalties provided in sections 6662(b)(6) and (i) and 6676 are limited to
the application of the economic substance doctrine and may not be imposed
due to the application of any other ‘similar rule of law’ or judicial doctrine
(e.g., step transaction doctrine, substance over form or sham
transaction).”195
The reality of tax shelters is that taxpayers know, for the most part, when
they enter a shelter whether the transaction lacks economic substance. Such
a transaction often is done solely for tax benefits, with only a fig leaf of
expected non-tax benefit or business purpose. While there existed semantic
differences to the variations courts have employed in the past, the bottom
line is that the most suspect transactions would have failed under any
variation of the economic substance test.
As applied by the courts, the economic substance test is little more than a
smell test and most technical tax shelters reek. Moreover, a failing
transaction would also likely fail some of the other common law judicial
doctrines used to attack tax shelters. However, the same is not true in
reverse: transactions failing some of the other doctrines would not
necessarily fail the economic substance test. That is where the “any similar
rule of law” language in the 2010 Act could be relevant.
The reasons for this are several, but the most common is that there are
often no legitimate non-tax reasons for most transactions failing the
economic substance test. For such transactions, the business purpose was
often ginned up by the promoters to provide a patina of legitimacy to what
otherwise would be a transfer of tax revenue from the government to the
taxpayer. More often than not, the promoter was not relying on a transaction
having economic substance, but rather on the transaction not being
discovered by the IRS (or being discovered too late for the government to
do anything about the transaction).196
It is for these reasons that codification will have little impact on
changing behaviors, because it does not fundamentally alter a taxpayer’s
calculus: no matter what variation the economic substance test, the
transaction will still likely fail. Thus, the only meaningful impact
codification will have is on the expected cost, through the strict liability
penalty provisions. However, that cost will not be high enough to change
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence,
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 582 (2006) [hereinafter Raskolnikov,
Crime and Punishment].
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behavior for most taxpayers with boxcar deficiencies, because the cost of
defending the transaction, even assuming litigation from audit through the
U.S. Supreme Court, will rarely be high enough to change a taxpayer’s
decision to enter the shelter in the first place.
V.

CHANGING THE CALCULUS

To change taxpayers’ behavior on tax shelters, the government will have
to act with stronger measures. Below are four incremental changes that
could materially affect taxpayers’ expected value calculations with respect
to multi-million dollar tax shelters:197
A.

Expand the Breadth of the Strict Liability Penalty

When Congress codified the economic substance doctrine, it gave the
IRS and Treasury the ability to expand the strict liability penalties to “any
similar rule of law.” There is general agreement that those similar rules of
law include sham transactions, substance over form, step transactions (the
“common law doctrines”), and possibly some of the myriad anti-abuse
provisions in the Code. To date, the IRS has declined Congress’ offer to
expand those penalties.
The caution the IRS has used in not expanding the “any similar rule of
law” language has made sense to date. Transactions lacking in economic
substance have few indicia of legitimacy apart from the tax benefits, while
transactions violating those “similar rules of law” are far more difficult to
categorize, which warrants caution. Moreover, had the IRS stepped
prematurely into the breach and sought to apply the “similar rules of law”
197. These changes in the law should not be across the board, but should be applied only to
taxpayers who participate in transactions generating over $1 million in tax benefits. Compared
to low or middle-income taxpayers, high-income taxpayers have more incentive to participate in
tax shelters. There are a number of reasons for this, including: higher marginal tax rates for high
income taxpayers means greater tax savings when that income is sheltered; transaction costs of
shelters can be better absorbed when more money is at stake, e.g., a strategy that costs $100,000
to make $1 million of gains disappear means the strategy must generate more than 10% tax
savings (based on the $1 million of gains) to make sense, while that same strategy seeking to
make $100 million of gains disappear makes sense as long as it generates 1% tax savings.
Moreover, from a policy perspective, it makes little sense to implement these changes for
smaller transactions because current law adequately covers such transactions, and the costs of an
across the board change would add nothing. Those who would argue fairness should remember
that there is a tax shelter regime for lower and middle income taxpayers, and it is called
employer withholding and reporting. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxes That Work: A Simple
American Plan, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1043 (2006); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms
and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1468 n.77 (2003).
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strict liability penalties to other transactions, they would have faced a twofront war from taxpayers. On one front, the taxpayers would have more
reason to fight, as the cost of the strict liability penalty would be directly
compared to the cost of litigation. In addition, because the taxpayer would
likely already be in litigation seeking to reduce penalties based on a
reasonable cause defense, the added cost to the taxpayer would be minimal.
The other front would be the courts. By not seeking to extend the
“similar rules of law” language to other transactions, the IRS has not given
taxpayers the ability to challenge any such extension. In addition, the IRS
has retained the right, if it so chooses, to wait for a particularly unctuous
transaction to seek to extend the doctrine in the future. That future will
probably occur when the economy improves, as there will be more
taxpayers with boxcar deficiencies willing to play the tax shelter game.
The only fault I assign to the IRS is in disclosing that it was shackling
itself with the “any similar rules of law” language. By publishing the ES
Directive, the IRS has reduced the uncertainty related to whether it would
expand the breadth of the economic substance penalties. That reduction in
uncertainty benefits taxpayers, permitting them to make a more informed
expected value calculation with respect to particular transactions. By way of
example, assume a taxpayer is evaluating a shelter and is fairly certain that
the shelter, if discovered, would fail one of the common law doctrines (and
potentially incur a 40% penalty) (“Penalty 1”) but would have enough
economic substance to avoid the economic substance strict liability penalty
(“Penalty 2”). That taxpayer is better able to price his risk with respect to
the transaction, because whatever the expected cost of Penalty 1, it is lower
than the combined cost of Penalty 1 and Penalty 2. By adding certainty on
the question of whether Penalty 2 could apply, the IRS has, for all intents
and purposes, decreased the potential cost to taxpayers entering into shelter
transactions. As a result, the decrease in the taxpayer’s expected cost
increases the likelihood the taxpayer will enter the shelter.
The IRS has, in the past, used uncertainty to frustrate taxpayer attempts
to game the system. One stark example is the synthetic fuel (“synfuel”) tax
credit from the early 2000s. Under a program created around 1980,
taxpayers could get a tax credit for sales of solid synthetic fuels produced
from coal.198 In 1986, the IRS provided guidance on what types of synthetic

198. See I.R.C. § 29 (2000) (current version at I.R.C. § 45 (2006)); Robert Mann, Another
Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal and the
Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 111, 132
(2007).

45:0000]

FINANCIAL ALCHEMY

55

fuel would qualify for the credit.199 Based on the tax credit, owners of
“approved” synthetic fuel plants could, at that time, sell synthetic fuel for
about $19 per ton and collect an additional $25 per ton in tax credits,
making the tax credit more valuable than the fuel.200 The problem, however,
was that the synthetic fuel produced had no discernible benefit over regular
coal, other than the tax credit.201
Those credits attracted the attention of tax shelter promoters, seeking to
move the credits away from coal producers to other companies that just
wanted to reduce their taxes. For example, in 2001, Marriott Corp.
purchased synthetic fuel plants to take advantage of the credit.202 Marriott
Corp. used those credits to cut its effective federal income tax rate to 6.8%
in 2002 (corporate taxes were set at 35% at the time),203 and to a negative
tax rate (yes, that means the government paid them) in 2003.204
Companies were able to abuse the synthetic fuel tax credit program
because the IRS failed to establish guidelines on what types of fuel would
qualify for the credits.205 The IRS regulations established only that coal
must undergo a “significant chemical change” to qualify for the credit.206
Although the credit was intended to encourage the creation of fuel from
nonconventional sources, companies found it more profitable to claim the
credit for the production of “synthetic” synthetic fuel. Media reports have
199. See Rev. Rul. 86-100, 1986-2 C.B. 3. In that Revenue Ruling, the IRS rules that a
particular mixture of coal and water did not qualify for the credit because there was no
significant chemical change. Id. That Revenue Ruling was the origin of the “significant
chemical change” standard that ballooned into the “spray and pray” tax shelter. See Mann, note
197, at 132.
200. See Treasury Department to Review Federal Tax-Credit Program Promoting Synthetic
Fuels, KY. NEW ERA, Oct. 9, 2000, at A7.
201. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Multibillion Dollar Coal Credit: Lots of
Form, Little Substance, TAX NOTES, Oct. 6, 2003, at 34. (“Marketable coal goes in and
marketable coal comes out . . . this type of ‘production’ does not deserve any federal subsidy.”).
202. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Romney as Audit Chair Saw Marriott Son of BOSS Shelter
Defy IRS, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2012, 10:01 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0222/Romney-as-auditing-chairman-saw-marriott-son-of-boss-tax-shelter-defy-irs.html
[hereinafter Drucker, Romney] (“In 2004, Marriott’s tax planning drew the ire of Senator John
McCain. Marriott received hundreds of millions of dollars in federal tax credits meant to
promote so-called synthetic fuel through a business purchased by Marriott in 2001 while
Romney sat on the board’s audit committee.”).
203. Id. The top U.S. corporate income tax rate at the time was 39%. See IRS,
CORPORATION INCOME TAX BRACKETS AND RATES, 1909–2002, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf.
204. Drucker, Romney, supra note 201.
205. One writer noted that “If there were an award for the worst tax credit ever, the section
29 nonconventional-source fuel tax credit as it applies to chemically modified coal would
probably be the winner.” Sullivan, supra note 200.
206. Id.
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detailed examples of companies spraying substances such as diesel fuel or
pine tar on already marketable coal to receive the credit. 207 The “spray and
pray” tax shelter was thus created.208
According to one member of Congress, “The companies claiming this
tax credit are little more than sorcerers who ‘spray and pray’ that the
government will foolishly continue to pay for their alchemy.”209 “This
provision has developed into nothing less than a complete scam, robbing the
public treasury of billions of dollars each year.”210
The synthetic fuel tax credit program was set to expire in 2007.211 Faced
with such a short time horizon, instead of seeking to change the law, the
IRS needed to come up with a way to keep the credit from exploding. In
2000, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2000-47, which provided that the
IRS would no longer issue “advance rulings or determination letters” on
whether a certain plant qualified for the tax credit.212 The IRS announced
that it made its decision because “[c]oncern has been raised that taxpayers
are also claiming the § 29 credit for processing coal in other ways that may
not have been intended by the Congress.”213
The immediate aftermath of the decision to issue Revenue Procedure
2000-47 was predictable: the industry was outraged, and they went to

207. In its 2009 annual report, Marriott reported that it was closing its synthetic fuel
operations because the tax credits were no longer available. MARRIOTT INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT
18, 38, 65 (2009). In its quarterly report for the quarter ended June 18, 2008, Marriott reported
that, “For the first half of 2007, the synthetic fuel operation generated revenue of $156 million.
Income from the Synthetic Fuel segment totaled $50 million, net of tax, in the first half of
2007.” MARRIOTT INT’L, QUARTERLY REPORT (FORM 10-Q) (July 11, 2008).
208. See John Connor & Leila Abboud, IRS Reviews Validity of Claims For Synthetic-Fuel
Tax
Credit,
WALL
ST.
J.,
June
30,
2003,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB105681655331371900.html.
209. See Lloyd Doggert, Green Congressman Reintroduces “Synfuel” Bill to Close
Corporate
Loophole,
AUSTIN SIERRAN,
May 2005,
at
7,
available
at
http://texas.sierraclub.org/austin/May05.pdf.
210. See Heidi Glenn, Doggett, Coleman Would End Synfuel Credit, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Apr. 28, 2004 (quoting Congressman Lloyd Doggett); see also Steve Huettel, Coal-Fueled
Savings,
ST.
PETERSBURG
TIMES,
Dec.
10,
2001,
available
at
http://www.sptimes.com/News/121001/news_pf/Business/Coal_fueled_savings.shtml (“‘It does
not enhance the heat content of the coal or cause it to burn more cleanly or efficiently,’
Kentucky Gov. Paul Patton wrote the Treasury Department last year, echoing the views of his
state’s coal producers. ‘If the coal were untreated, it would still be burned in a power plant and
produce as much electricity. . . . The way this program is being used is an outrage.’”).
211. See I.R.C. §§ 45K(e)(2), (f)(1)(B) (2006).
212. Rev. Proc. 2000-47, 2000-46 I.R.B. 482.
213. Id.
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Congress to get the IRS to change its mind.214 Nevertheless, the IRS tactic
worked, in that the number of companies seeking to claim the credit now
faced uncertainty about their ability to do so.215 I propose the IRS introduce
some uncertainty surrounding the imposition of the strict liability penalties.
That uncertainty should, at a minimum, increase the potential costs, and
thereby decrease the perceived benefits, from participating in tax shelters.216
B.

Increase Likelihood of Detection

“Low detection rates, combined with inadequate penalties, and enormous
information asymmetries, leave the IRS at a vast disadvantage in attempts
to restrain taxpayers from taking overly aggressive or abusive positions on

214. See, e.g., Letter from Rick Santorum, U.S. Senator, to Paul O’Neill, Sec’y of the
Treasury (Feb. 16, 2001), in Santorum Wants Advance Rulings for Synthetic Fuel Projects
Restarted, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 16, 2001. Sen. Santorum stated:
If Treasury and the IRS believe that there are abuses taking place with regard
to certain coal synfuels projects, such abuses should be addressed on a caseby-case basis through the Service’s ordinary ruling and audit procedures—
not by retroactively changing the rules of the game for taxpayers who
reasonably relied on the standards established by the federal government for
this program.
Id.; see also Letter from Mike Doyle, U.S. Representative, to Paul O’Neill, Sec’y of the
Treasury (Mar. 30, 2001), in Doyle Urges Treasury to Reconsider Issuing PLRs for Synthetic
Fuel Producers, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 3, 2001; Santorum Again Urges Treasury to
Reconsider Position on Nonconventional Fuel Credit, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 12, 2001
(reporting Senator Rick Santorum’s second letter to Paul O’Neill dated August 30, 2001). In
addition, “on October 3, 2000, House Ways and Means Committee members E. Clay Shaw Jr.,
R-Fla., Karen Thurman, D-Fla., and Mark Foley, R-Fla., wrote a letter to the Treasury
Department expressing their opposition to a suspension ‘or even a pause’ in the rulings
program.” Sullivan, supra note 200. Also, “[i]n an October 20, 2000, letter, Reps. Spencer
Bachus, R-Ala., Bud Cramer, D-Ala., and Robert Aderholt, R-Ala., urged the IRS and Treasury
not to suspend action on section 29 ruling requests when reviewing the policy on tax credits for
synfuel from coal.” Id.
215. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Great Energy Scam, TIME , Oct. 4,
2003,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,493241,00.html#ixzz26SmPUc3A ( “The
IRS review of the synfuel industry has for the time being halted the buying and selling of
credits.”).
216. Cf., Charles A. Rose, Note, The Tax Lawyer’s Dilemma: Recent Developments
Heighten Tax Lawyer Responsibilities and Liabilities, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258 (2011). In
his note, Mr. Rose argues that “the strict liability feature of the codified economic substance
doctrine is unfair to the taxpayer and hinders the ability of courts to analyze the facts and
circumstances of each case,” and further argues that the “idea that strict liability serves as an
effective deterrent to tax lawyers engaged in tax shelter promotion is misplaced, as tax lawyers
are regulated under standards of professional responsibility, rather than through understatement
penalties.” Id. at 292–93.
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their tax returns.”217 Taxpayers are thus encouraged to play the so-called
audit lottery.218
As noted above, the chance of detection has a great deal of influence on
the expected value of a shelter. However, given the sheer number of
taxpayers and the limited number of IRS agents (and the fact that the IRS
published its audit data), taxpayers have a relatively clear view of their audit
likelihood. Two modest changes could change a taxpayer’s expected value
calculation: (1) require opinion disclosure for penalty protection, and (2)
extend the statute of limitations for transactions lacking economic substance
or any “similar rules of law” as defined in section 7701(o).
1.

Require Opinion Disclosure for Penalty Protection

The IRS could affect taxpayer behavior by requiring taxpayers to
disclose any tax opinions with their returns. As a practical matter, one of the
main purposes of a tax shelter opinion is, at least for transactions that do not
violate the economic substance test, to avoid penalties. As such, the IRS
should require taxpayers to disclose any tax opinions if the taxpayer is
going to use the opinion for penalty protection. That way, the taxpayer has a
choice: disclose the opinion to reduce the likelihood of penalties (but
increase the transparency of the transaction to the IRS) or withhold the
opinion and lose the penalty protection. Moreover, by giving the taxpayer
the choice of whether to disclose the opinion, the government puts the onus
on the taxpayer. In either case, the potential cost of the shelter rises from an
expected value perspective: either the probability of detection increases
because the opinion was disclosed or the cost of getting caught increases
because the taxpayer loses its penalty protection ability based on
nondisclosure of the opinion.
2.

Extend the Statute of Limitations

Another change the government should contemplate is extending the
statute of limitations for tax shelter participants. Such a change will increase
the likelihood of detection, thereby decreasing a taxpayer’s expected value
of participation.
Currently, the government has three years to identify and challenge a
taxpayer’s return. As noted above, the government unsuccessfully sought to
extend the three-year statute of limitations in Son of Boss cases, and, had
217. See Holmes, supra note 165, at 1422.
218. See Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 195, at 582.
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they been successful, such extension would have brought in over a billion
dollars in taxes. The IRS and Treasury should ask Congress to extend the
statute of limitations for 7701(o) transactions from three to six years, a
recommendation previously sought with respect to other types of tax
shelters.219 Some lawyers have already opined on how the Home Concrete
decision can help taxpayers by limiting their risk to three years.220
C.

Increase the Cost of Failure

The costs of a tax shelter’s failure are, for the most part, quantifiable. To
change behaviors, those costs need to increase. Three obvious candidates to
increase those costs are: (1) add hard to quantify costs; (2) make it easier
for taxpayers to sue their advisors; and (3) increase the interest costs to the
actual return taxpayers received on the money they saved up front by
participating in the shelter.
1.

Add Hard to Quantify Costs

The IRS and Department of Justice need to focus more resources on
holding tax shelter participants criminally liable. Too often, all taxpayers
(not just the wealthy) think of cheating on their taxes as simply a way of
doing business. Even when promoters are caught, their tax shelter clients
sheepishly claim to have been duped and act outraged that there was tax
cheating going on. Arguments for criminalization will often fail, because
the line for most taxpayers is not between “tax evasion and tax avoidance”
as some suggest.221 Rather, the line is really between impermissible tax
avoidance and permissible tax avoidance, and that line is not a line at all,
but a hazy field where tax professionals play. Notwithstanding those
pressures, an increased effort to find criminal violations in tax shelters
could bear fruit. Having worked in the tax shelter industry for a number of
years prior to joining the Department of Justice’s Tax Division, and having
219. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, STAFF REPORT ON
TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 17 (2008), available at
www.hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf (“Congress should extend from three
years to six years the amount of time IRS has after a return is filed to investigate and propose
assessments of additional tax if the case involves an offshore tax haven with secrecy laws and
practices.”).
220. See Thomas Jaworski, Home Concrete Decision Alters Accounting, Reserves for
Uncertain Tax Positions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 29, 2013 (citing Matthew D. Lerner at
Steptoe & Johnson LLP in noting that “Companies should no longer feel obliged to retain their
reserves [for uncertain tax positions] beyond the three-year limitations period”).
221. See Holmes, supra note 165, at 1417.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

60

[Ariz. St. L.J.

prosecuted tax cheats while there, I can attest to the fact that there were a
number of prosecutable crimes hidden in many of the Son of Boss and CDS
tax shelters (particularly for prosecutors with experience in the area).
Unfortunately, few prosecutors are equipped to unravel a tax shelter, and,
for better or worse, the government tends to seek out the low hanging fruit
when looking to criminalize tax shelter conduct.222

2.

Make It Easier for Clients to Sue Their Advisors

While most of the proposals noted herein refer to the demand side of the
equation, one supply side proposal is warranted: make it easier for clients to
sue the tax shelter promoters. In the past few years, taxpayers have
increasingly brought malpractice cases against their advisors for tax shelter
transactions.223 Some have noted the increase in malpractice cases, and
argued that the increase, coupled with greater government opprobrium, has
222. Two relatively recent tax shelter cases against individuals associated with some of the
largest tax shelter promoters in the United States bears this out. In one, U.S. v. Greenstein, the
government prosecuted two tax shelter promoters for a tax scheme based on an offshore fund
they claimed had over $9 billion in assets, but, according to the government, in fact had “no
assets or employees.” See Press Release, DOJ, Former Quellos Executives Sentenced in
Offshore Tax Shelter Scam Involving More than $9.6 Billion in Phony Stock Sales, Men
Fabricated Losses as a Tool to Help Wealthy Avoid Taxes (Jan. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2011/jan/quellos.html. The indictment filed in that case
is
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2011/jan/pdfs/quellos%20second%20sup%20indictmen
t.pdf. In another criminal tax shelter case, KPMG, the accounting firm, admitted to criminal
wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties as part of an
agreement to defer prosecution of the firm. Press Release, IRS, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for
Criminal Violations IR–2005–83 (Aug. 29, 2005). As part of the same case, two KPMG
partners and a lawyer they worked with were also convicted of tax fraud. The KPMG-related
prosecution was part of a larger case, U.S. v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). In Stein,
thirteen codefendants were dismissed because, according to the Second Circuit (and some very
talented attorneys), the government improperly forced KPMG to stop paying the defendants’
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 135. The Stein court determined that such interference “deliberately or
callously” prevented many of the defendants from getting funds for their defense, blocking them
from hiring the lawyers of their choice. See, e.g., Charges Against 13 KPMG Defendants
Dropped, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500395_1623061910.html. I am unaware of any non-white collar defendants having success with the
argument that they were prevented from hiring their attorney of choice because the government
pressured the criminal enterprise for whom they worked from paying their legal bills.
223. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax
Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267 (2008). Professor Soled noted that although it is impossible
to determine with accuracy the number of malpractice cases, with so many taxpayers settling tax
shelter transactions in the 2000s, it was “reasonable to assume that a significant number of these
former shelter investors subsequently sued their tax advisors for . . . , at the very least, fees
associated with the failed tax shelter advice.” Id. at 268 n.1.
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caused many tax professionals to stop promoting aggressive, large-scale tax
shelters.224 While possibly true, a better explanation is the economy from
2008 onward. As a practical matter, tax shelters are valuable only to
taxpayers with income to shelter, and since 2008, fewer clients have been in
the market to shelter hundreds of millions of dollars of gains.
Although the government’s efforts and the increase in malpractice cases
may have had an impact, it is far too early to determine whether that impact
will last through the next bull market. Nevertheless, the government should
act to diminish the procedural hurdles to tax malpractice suits, starting with
the statute of limitations for taxpayers seeking to institute such suits.
Courts interpreting state law have most often used four different starting
points for the statute of limitations, including (1) when the malpractice
occurred; (2) when the malpractice was discovered or discoverable; (3)
when the injury was suffered; and (4) when the injury was discovered or
discoverable.225 Those four starting points lead to an array of difficult issues
for the courts, because using those four starting criteria, the statute of
limitations could begin (1) when the advice is rendered; (2) when the tax
return is submitted; (3) when the IRS issues a public pronouncement (which
has no legal effect) challenging a transaction’s tax benefits; (4) when the
IRS audits a taxpayer’s return; or (5) when the case is finalized, either by
settlement or when the taxpayer has completed litigation and appeal
opportunities have been exhausted.226 The problem is worsened by the long
lead time of tax shelter cases. The 2012 Home Concrete decision was based
on a tax shelter transaction for which returns were filed in 1999 and 2000.
While the taxpayer prevailed in Home Concrete, had the taxpayer lost and
decided to institute a tax malpractice case against its advisors, there could
be numerous possible starting points for the litigation: (1) when the tax
advice was rendered (1999-2000); (2) when the returns were submitted
(2000-2001); (3) when the IRS issued its first Son of Boss pronouncement
(2002); (4) when the taxpayer’s return was audited (2006 in the Home
Concrete case); or (5) when the Supreme Court decided the Home Concrete
case (April 25, 2012).227

224. Id. at 269–70.
225. See id. at 316–17 (citing BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
§ 601.2.3 at 461–62 (6th ed. 2004)).
226. Soled, supra note 222, at 317, (citing Jacob L. Todres, Investment in a Bad Tax
Shelter: Malpractice Recovery is No Slam-Dunk, 107 TAX NOTES 217 (2005)).
227. U.S. v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Patrick Temple-West,
Supreme Court Restrains IRS in Tax Shelter Case, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012, 1:03 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-tax-supreme-courtidUSBRE83O11920120425.
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A clear problem with providing a longer statute of limitations for these
cases is that it provides a benefit to one group (the super-wealthy taxpayers
playing the shelter game) against another group (the just plain wealthy who
charge fees selling tax shelters to the super wealthy). However bad the
optics of such a rule, if the goal is stemming the tide of tax shelters, such a
provision could move the needle on a promoter’s desire to create, market,
and implement new tax shelters, at least those for which the primary goal is
to avoid detection because the underlying transaction is meritless.
3.

Change the Interest Calculation

The government should re-tool the interest calculator for tax shelter
underpayments and associated penalties. When taxpayers are required to
repay the taxes avoided from prior years (underpayments) after a
determination that those tax benefits were unwarranted, the law requires the
taxpayer to pay those taxes back with interest. Section 6621 of the Internal
Revenue Code establishes the rates for interest on tax underpayments and
penalties,228 and that rate is equal to the federal short-term rate229 plus 3%
(or 5% for “large corporate” underpayments)230 (collectively, the
“underpayment rate”).231
That underpayment rate often fails to match the earnings the taxpayer
makes on his or her funds in the time period between when the taxpayer
realizes the benefits and the time the government is repaid with interest.
Those earnings are often a windfall for the taxpayer, rewarding the
taxpayer’s gambit with a time value of money bonus. From January 2002
through January 2012, the underpayment rate for individual taxpayers has
been between 3% and 8%, and for corporate taxpayers has been between 5
and 10% for large corporate underpayments.232
Instead of charging a set rate, the government should require taxpayers to
provide, under penalties of perjury, a calculation of their earnings since the
tax benefits were realized. Once that amount is calculated, the taxpayer
should be required to pay the greater of the underpayment rate or the
earnings on the tax benefits. As most taxpayers will have provided the
228. Rev. Rul. 2011-18, 2011-39 I.R.B. 428.
229. The federal short-term rate is determined in accordance with I.R.C. § 1274(d) during
January of each year and is published in a Revenue Ruling. For 2012, the rate was published in
Revenue Ruling 2012-7, 2012-6 I.R.B. 362, to take effect beginning February 1, 2012.
230. See I.R.C. § 6621(c) (2006) and Treas. Reg. § 301.6621–3 (1992) for the definition of
a large corporate underpayment.
231. I.R.C. § 6621(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.6621–3 (1992).
232. Rev. Rul. 2012-8, 2012-13 I.R.B. 563, 571.
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government with at least one check to whatever calculation they provide
(the tax returns filed in the interim), the government has a natural check to
determine the veracity of the taxpayer’s calculation. Moreover, by requiring
a jurat, the government would also create a not-strictly-economic variable to
the expected value calculation: the threat of prison for perjury.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The technical tax shelter has not disappeared. What has disappeared is
the income that has driven the shelters—the economy of the past few years
has not given taxpayers great need to shelter income. In all likelihood, that
will change in the future, and taxpayers will be flocking to tax shelters
again. While the activity in the area is slow, the government should shore
up its defenses, else it will be again overwhelmed by a herd of one-off tax
shelters.
As noted above, economic substance is opportunistically easy to
structure around and provides little deterrence to sophisticated tax planners.
For the better part of my pre-academic life, I worked in the tax shelter area,
structuring them, writing opinions for them, attacking them (occasionally)
as a federal tax prosecutor, and finally defending the people who
participated in them. One clear lesson in that last role is that the biggest
determinant of whether the IRS attacked your transaction was the amount of
greed built in. That greed was often in the form of a transaction that made
no economic sense, but generated outsized tax benefits. After looking at
many such transactions over and over, it became clear that the transactions
at issue could have been structured to avoid failing the economic substance
test at little cost to the taxpayer. However, greed often overwhelmed
sensible tax planning, because the benefits outweighed the costs. If the
government wants to slow the spread of shelters that will go along with the
next boom cycle, it should act now to change the calculus and make the
potential costs more of a factor in wealthy taxpayer’s calculus.

